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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(a) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the CSRB erred in denying Appellant's Request for Default. 
In the instant case, the CSRB denied Appellant's request for default even though 
the Agency had failed to timely file as required by Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(2)(a). 
The CSRB's denial of Appellant's request was not based upon a finding of "excusable 
neglect." Indeed, the Agency did not even argue that its failure to timely file its Step 6 
brief was due to excusable neglect when it initially sought an extension of time within 
which to file its brief. [See attached Addendum "5"]. There is no way that the Agency 
could establish "excusable neglect" because R137-l-22(2)(a) put the Agency on notice 
that its Step 6 brief was to be filed within 30 days from the day that the Agency received 
the Step 5 transcript. 
Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii), which allows relief if the 
agency's action is contrary to its own rules, provides the bases for appellate review. 
When a party invokes subsection (h)(ii) as the basis for appeal, the agency's actions are 
reviewed under a "reasonable and rational/intermediate" standard. Semeco Industries v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com 'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993). 
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2. Whether the CSRB erred in finding that Appellant's "Memorandum of 
Supplemental Controlling Authorities and Documents in Support Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal" was untimely filed 
and that the issues raised therein had been previously addressed in a prior 
order. 
At the opening of the Step 6 hearing on January 27, 2004, Appellant's counsel 
made an oral motion to the CSRB to bifurcate the hearing requesting that the CSRB allow 
for a discussion of Appellant's concerns related to the Default Certificate, motion for 
reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal and the memorandum of supplemental 
controlling authorities. The CSRB allowed respective counsel to address the matter. 
When the CSRB issued its Step 6 decision, however, it found that the Appellant's 
filing of the memorandum of supplemental controlling authorities on January 26, 2004 
constituted a new motion and was "untimely." The CSRB refused to consider it because 
the issue of untimely filing was "previously addressed" and that the Agency's delay in 
filing was due to "excusable neglect." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) grants an appellate court the power to 
provide relief from a final agency action if the agency action is "otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious." When a party invokes subsection (h)(iv) as the basis for appeal, the agency's 
actions are reviewed under a "reasonable and rational/intermediate" standard. Semeco 
Industries v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com Vz, 849 P.2d at 1174. 
3. Whether the CSRB erred in finding that Appellant abandoned her position. 
At the Step 6 level, the CSRB ultimately found that Appellant "abandoned" her 
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position. Utah Admin. Code R477-12-2 defines "abandonment of position." Because 
Appellant gave proper notification under that provision, the CSRB erred in finding that 
Appellant abandoned her position. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), allows an appellate court to grant relief to from 
a final agency action if "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." When 
a party invokes subsection (d) as the basis for appeal, the agency's interpretation and 
application of the law are reviewed under a "correction of error/no deference" standard. 
Semeco Industries v. Auditing Div, of Utah State Tax Com yny 849 P.2d at 1171-72. 
ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE PRESERVED 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Career Service Review Board's ("CSRB") Step 6 
decision and final agency action issued on April 16, 2004 ("Step 6 Decision") against 
Appellant and in favor of Appellee ("the Agency.") [See attached Addendum "1"]. 
Specifically, Appellant seeks appellate review of the CSRB's denial of Appellant's 
November 10, 2003 default certificate. Appellant also seeks review of the CSRB's 
finding that Appellant's January 26, 2004 memorandum of supplemental controlling 
authorities was "untimely filed" and that the issues raised in the memorandum had already 
been resolved by a prior CSRB order. Appellant also appeals the finding by the CSRB 
that she "abandoned her position." 
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Appellant worked as a nurse on the Children's Unit of the Utah State Hospital in 
Provo, Utah. Appellant has a daughter who is disabled. 1 [Step 5 R. 327:4-11; 302:14-
20]. Appellant is the sole care provider for the child. [Step 5 R. 297:2-8]. At hiring and 
thereafter, Appellant told her supervisors that her daughter was disabled and that she 
could not work late evening or night shifts because of her daughter's disability. [Step 5 
R. 299:6-25]. On rare occasions, Appellant covered a night shift or went on an overnight 
camp out for work, but only after she had been given significant advance notice. [Step 5 
R. 297:6-25]. Appellant received excellent performance reviews during her period of 
employment and was deemed a superior employee. [Step 5 R. 114:4-15; 119:15-25]. In 
fact, Appellant trained many of her supervisors and other staff members. [Step 5 R. 
313:22-25]. Appellant also instituted a pet program at the Utah State Hospital. [Step 5 R. 
314:5-11]. 
On February 19, 2003, Appellant, who was still on FMLA leave for sugery, was 
called into a meeting with her supervisors Francesco Lepore, Diane Maciel, and Chris 
Metcalf. [Step 5 R. 76:10-23; 299:2-7]. During the February 19, 2003 meeting, Appellant 
and her supervisors engaged in a heated debate. During that meeting Appellant was 
informed that she was to be "administratively moved" from the Pediatric Unit to the 
Geriatric Unit and that her new shift would cover late-evening hours until the morning 
1. Hereinafter, the recorded transcript of the Step 5 hearing shall be referred to as "Step 5 
R." The recorded transcript of the Step 6 hearing shall be referred to as "Step 6 R." 
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(10:00 p.m.-6:00 a.m.). [Step 5 R. 79:24 through 80:22; 305:8-19]. 
Prior to the February 19, 2003 meeting, the Agency had never required Appellant 
to work the graveyard shift because of Appellant's responsibility for her disabled child. At 
the February 19, 2003 meeting, Appellant indicated that if she was forced to take the 
graveyard shift she would be unable to show up to work because of her child's care needs. 
Appellant was very emotional and stated that she would have to quit because she could 
not work the graveyard shift. [Step 5 R. 155:14-23; 306:3-18]. During the February 19, 
2003 meeting, Chris Metcalf repeatedly stated that Appellant was required to show up to 
r 
Appellant's new graveyard shift or else Appellant would need to submit a resignation 
document and turn in her keys. [Step 5 R. 155:14 through 156:9; 181:2]. Appellant 
reiterated that she could not work the graveyard shift. Appellant was well-aware of the 
call off policy, but did not call off because she repeatedly told her three supervisors that 
she would not be at work for the graveyard shift. [Step 5 R. 310:11 through 311:6]. 
Chris Metcalf instructed Appellant that if she were going to quit, Appellant would 
need to file a letter of resignation. [Step 5 R. 156:1-5; 166:3-6]. Appellant never 
submitted a resignation document. Appellant never turned in her keys or badge, because 
Appellant did not intend to resign. Appellant is still in possession of her keys and badge. 
On February 25, 2003, Mark Payne, the Superintendent of the Utah State Hospital 
issued to Appellant a letter of termination. Appellant was terminated for "abandonment" 
of her position. [See attached Addendum "2"]. 
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The Step 5 Hearing and Decision 
On August 12, 2003, a Step 5 hearing was held before CSRB Hearing Officer 
Mark E. Kleinfeld ("Officer Kleinfeld"). At that time, the Agency was represented by 
counsel, Laurie Noda. A certified court reporter from Thacker & Co., LLC made a 
verbatim record of the proceeding. 
During the Step 5 hearing, the Agency's witness, Robin Arnold Williams 
(executive director of the Department of Human Services), was qualified as an expert on 
DHRM polices. [Step 5 R. 55:4-25]. Williams testified on cross-examination that Utah 
State Hospital's Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, § 23 of the Utah State Hospital 
Operational Policy and Procedure Manual ("Policy 23") would not apply to Appellant's 
situation because her absence from work was not the result of illness or an emergency. 
[Step 5 R. 49:25 through 51:9].2 Furthermore, Williams acknowledged that an 
employee's verbal notice to a supervisor that the employee would not be present for a 
shift could, on an individual basis, be considered "proper notification" under DHRM 
R477-12-2. [Step 5 R. 56:7-24].3 
2. Policy 23 requires direct patient care workers to provide telephonic notice at least two 
hours before a scheduled shift if the employee is unable to work that shift. Policy 23 
requires the employee to call in every day of absence unless the employee has a doctor's 
note. Policy 23 provides that "calling off is to be used for "illness or extreme 
emergencies only (emphasis added)." Finally, Policy 23 indicates that if "an employee is 
a no call/no show for three consecutive days, it will be considered job abandonment by the 
employee and grounds for termination." 
3. DHRM R477-12-2 is the general rule defining "abandonment" and should be read in 
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On August 29, 2003, Officer Kleinfeld issued his "Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Decision and Order" ("Step 5 Decision"). [See attached Addendum "3"]. 
Therein, Officer Kleinfeld found that Appellant did abandon her position, but that 
Appellant's dismissal did not meet the standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) 
which requires that the dismissal "advance the good of the public service" or for "just 
cause." Accordingly, Officer Kleinfeld reinstated Appellant's employment with a 
demotion to the lowest pay rate available for her position. 
Appeal of the Step 5 Hearing 
Laurie Noda, on behalf of the Agency, appealed the Step 5 Decision. On October 
10, 2003 Robert W. Thompson, administrator for the CSRB, issued a scheduling order to 
the parties detailing the deadlines for submission of the parties' briefs. [See attached 
Addendum "4"]. A certificate of service accompanied the scheduling order. The 
certificate of service, signed by Claudia L. Jones, indicates that an email copy of the 
scheduling order was delivered to Ms. Debra Moore ("Ms. Moore"), the newly appointed 
attorney for the Agency. 
The scheduling order set the due date for the Agency's brief as November 10, 
2003. As of the November 10 deadline, the Agency had still not filed its brief. 
conjunction with Policy 23. DHRM R477-12-2 provides that "[e]mployees who are 
absent from work for three consecutive working days and are capable of providing proper 
notification to their supervisor, but do not, shall be considered to have abandoned their 
position (emphasis added)." 
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Appellant's counsel submitted a default certificate. On November 18, 2003, Ms. Moore 
informed the CSRB that she had never received a copy of the scheduling order even 
though a certificate of service represented that the scheduling order had been e-mailed. 
Ms. Moore also requested an enlargement of time within which to file the Agency's Step 
6 brief. The Agency did not mention the standard of "excusable neglect" in making its 
request. [See attached Addendum "5"]. 
On November 19, 2003, the CSRB "after carefully considering [Appellant's] 
request and thoroughly reviewing the file" issued an order denying Appellant's request for 
default on the basis that there was "substantial uncertainty as to whether counsel for the 
Department ever in fact received notice of the Board's October 10, 2003, scheduling 
order." [See attached Addendum "6"]. That same order set December 8, 2003 as the new 
deadline for the filing of the Agency's brief. 
On December 5, 2003, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or for 
interlocutory appeal of the CSRB's November 19, 2003 Order denying Appellant's 
request for default. [See attached Addendum "7"]. The Agency filed a memorandum in 
opposition to motion for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal on December 12, 
2003. [See attached Addendum "8"]. The CSRB issued a denial of Appellant's motion 
for reconsideration or interlocutory appeal on January 27, 2004. [See attached Addendum 
"9"]. On January 28, 2004, the CSRB sent notice of the Step 6 hearing to be held on 
February 20, 2004. [See attached Addendum "10"]. 
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On January 26, 2004 (the day immediately preceding the date for the Step 6 
hearing), Appellant's counsel telephoned Thacker & Co., whose certified reporter, Kerry 
Sorensen, had recorded the Step 5 hearing. During the phone call, a Thacker & Co. 
representative verified that Ms. Moore had, in fact, requested and received a copy of the 
transcript of the Step 5 hearing. Thacker & Co. then sent a copy of a letter it had received 
from Ms. Moore's office dated September 8, 2003. [See attached Addendum "11"]. This 
letter, signed by Ms. Moore's legal secretary proves that the Agency's attorney ordered a 
copy of the Step 5 hearing transcript on September 8, 2003. Equally important, the "cc" 
line of the letter indicates that a copy of that letter was sent to Claudia Jones at the CSRB 
but not to Appellant's counsel. Thacker & Co., also sent Appellant's counsel the 
verification sheet that Ms. Moore's office had received the transcript by courier delivery 
on October 8, 2003. [See attached Addendum "12"]. 
Neither the CSRB nor Ms. Moore had disclosed this information to Appellant's 
counsel. This information was obtained independently by Appellant's counsel the day 
before the Step 6 hearing. In light of the new information, Appellant's counsel prepared a 
"memorandum of supplemental controlling authorities and documents in support of 
Grievant's [Appellant's] motion for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal." [See 
attached Addendum "13"]. This memorandum was filed on January 26, 2004. Therein, 
Appellant argued that the Agency had failed to comply with R137-l-22(2)(a) of the Utah 
Admin. Code which provides: 
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"[t]he appellant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of 
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 
30 calendar days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the 
administration. Additionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of 
the appellant's brief 
Because it had been established that Ms. Moore's office had received the transcript 
of the Step 5 hearing on October 8, 2003, the Agency's Step 6 brief was due on 
November 8, 2003 pursuant to R137-l-22(2)(a) even if Ms. Moore had never received a 
copy of the October 10, 2003 scheduling order. 
At the opening of the Step 6 hearing on January 27, 2004, Mr. Heideman, 
Appellant's counsel, made an oral motion to the CSRB to bifurcate the hearing in order to 
allow a discussion of the default certificate, motion for reconsideration or for interlocutory 
appeal and the memorandum of supplemental controlling authorities concerning the 
Agency's late filing. [Step 6 R. 5:4-12]. Ms. Moore moved to strike the memorandum of 
supplemental authorities because Appellant's motion for default had already been 
previously denied and because there was "nothing raised in the supplemental 
memorandum that could not have been raised before." [Step 6 R. 5:17-22; 6:11-14]. 
Appellant's counsel responded that the September 8, 2003 letter confirming that the Step 
5 transcript had been ordered and the corresponding verification sheet had never been sent 
to Appellant's counsel by Ms. Moore or the CSRB. [Step 6 R. 6:15-25; 7:1-2]. 
The CSRB allowed respective counsel the opportunity to address the allegations of 
the untimely filing of the Agency's Step 6 brief. [Step 6 R. Appellant's counsel 14:21 
Page 10 of 35 
through 19:8; Agency's counsel 37:13 through 41:15]. 
When the CSRB issued its Step 6 Decision, however, it found that the Appellant's 
filing of the memorandum of supplemental controlling authorities on January 26, 2004 
constituted a new motion and was "untimely" and that the supplemental memorandum 
raised issues previously resolved by an earlier CSRB order. The CSRB therefore declined 
to consider it. [See Addendum " 1 , " pp. 2-3, fn. 2]. The CSRB concluded that the issue of 
untimely filing was "previously addressed" and that the Agency's delay in filing was due 
to "excusable neglect." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Agency failed to timely file its Step 6 brief both as required by Utah Admin. 
Code R137-l-22(2)(a) and by the CSRB. Appellant filed a default certificate. 
Subsequently, the Agency requested an additional 30 days within which to file its Step 6 
brief. The basis for the Agency's request was that the Agency's attorney did not receive 
an email copy of the scheduling order. Appellant argues on appeal that the CSRB failed 
to require the Agency to show that the Agency's failure to timely file the Step 6 brief was 
due to "excusable neglect." Furthermore, Appellant argues that even if the CSRB had 
required the Agency to prove excusable neglect, the Agency could not have met that 
standard because Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(2)(a) requires a party appealing the Step 
5 decision to file its brief within 30 days from the date that the party receives the Step 5 
transcript. The CSRB's actions do not comport with applicable Utah Admin. Code 
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provisions. 
The Agency also failed to consider Appellant's supplemental memorandum filed 
on January 26, 2004. The supplemental memorandum contained relevant information 
proving that the Agency's attorney had ordered and received the Step 5 transcript. 
Appellant did not discover this information until January 26, 2004—the day immediately 
preceding the Step 6 hearing. The CSRB and the Agency were both privy to the 
information, but did not inform Appellant of the facts. The CSRB ultimately rejected 
Appellant's supplemental memorandum on the basis that it was filed "untimely" and that 
the issues raised therein had previously been resolved by an earlier CSRB order. The 
CSRB's decision to reject the supplement memorandum was arbitrary and capricious. 
Finally, the CSRB erred in finding that Appellant "abandoned" her position. 
Appellant gave "proper notification" of her intent not to attend work pursuant to Utah 
Admin. Code R477-12-2 and therefore did not "abandon" her position. In finding that 
Appellant abandoned her position, the CSRB erroneously interpreted and applied the law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CSRB ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S INITIAL REQEUST FOR 
DEFAULT. 
A. The CSRB should have granted Appellant's request for default because 
the Agency failed to demonstrate "excusable neglect" for failing to 
timely file its Step 6 brief. 
The CSRB erred in denying Appellant's first request for default filed on November 
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10, 2003. The Agency ordered the transcript for the Step 5 hearing, but then failed to 
timely file its Step 6 brief in compliance with Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(2)(a). 
Accordingly, Appellant filed a default certificate. In its November 19, 2003 Order, 
however, the CSRB refused to enter a default against the Agency as requested by 
Appellant. The CSRB also granted the Agency an additional month within which to file 
its Step 6 brief. The CSRB's Order contained no finding that the Agency's failure to 
timely file its Step 6 brief was a result of "excusable neglect" as required by Utah Admin. 
Code Rl 37-1-18. In fact, the Agency never even argued that its failure to timely file its 
brief was due to excusable neglect. 
Even if the Agency's attorney had not received the email containing the Step 6 
brief scheduling order (as she has asserted), R137-l-22(2)(a) specifically establishes that a 
party appealing a Step 5 decision has 30 calendar days from the date of receipt of the Step 
5 transcript to file its Step 6 brief. Thus, the Agency was on notice when it received the 
Step 5 transcript that it would have 30 days within which to file its Step 6 brief. The fact 
that the Agency was on notice negates any argument by the Agency that its failure to 
timely file its Step 6 brief was due to "excusable neglect.' 
Also troubling is the CSRB assertion in the November 19, 2003 Order that it has 
"carefully" considered Appellant's request for default and "thoroughly" reviewed the file. 
If the CSRB had, in fact, "carefully" considered Appellant's request and "thoroughly" 
reviewed the file, the CSRB surely would have located the September 8, 2003 letter 
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proving that Ms. Moore's office had ordered the transcript (a copy of which letter was 
delivered to the CSRB). The CSRB should have realized that Robert Thompson had 
issued a scheduling order because Ms. Moore had received the transcript. Instead, the 
CSRB failed to disclose the existence of the ex parte September 8, 2003 letter and simply 
ruled that it was "uncertain" whether Ms. Moore had received notice of the October 10, 
2003 scheduling order. 
B* Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error. 
Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error in failing to grant 
default. "The requirement of 'substantial prejudice' in [Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-
16(4)] manifests the legislature's intent that relief not be given for an agency error if the 
error was harmless." Stokes v. Board of Review of Indus. Com }n of Utah, 832 P.2d 56, 58 
(Utah App., 1992) (internal citations omitted). 
In Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com 'n, 814 P.2d 581, 
584 (Utah, 1991), the Court explained: 
[S]ection 63-46b-16(4) ensures that relief should not be granted when, 
although the agency committed error, the error was harmless. Indeed, the 
language of section 63-46b-16(4) is similar to language in rules of procedure 
and evidence dealing with harmless error. Given this similarity in language, 
we conclude that the legislature in enacting section 63 -46b-16(4) intended that 
the same standard used for determining the harmfulness of error in appeals 
from judicial proceedings should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under 
this standard, an error will be harmless if it is "sufficiently inconsequential that 
. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." 
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In the instant case, the CSRB's error in refusing to grant default in favor of 
Appellant significantly "affected the outcome of the proceedings/' Clearly, if the CSRB 
had complied with its own internal rules and policies, the Appellant's request for default 
would have been granted, and the Step 5 ruling would have become the final action of the 
CSRB instead of the subsequent Step 6 ruling (i.e. Appellant would still have her job). At 
the very least, the Agency would have been required to make a showing of "excusable 
neglect" for failing to timely file its Step 6 brief—something Appellant asserts that the 
Agency could not do given the clear 30-day requirement Utah Admin. Code Rl 37-1-22. 
C This Court should find that the CSRB's failure to grant default is 
contrary to the CSRB's own rules and that Appellant is entitled to 
relief under Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) provides the appropriate basis for review of 
the CSRB's refusal to grant Appellant's initial request for default. Pursuant to § 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(ii), an appellate court may grant relief if an agency's action is contrary to its own 
internal rules. The appellate court should review the agency's actions under a "reasonable 
and rational/intermediate" standard. Semeco Industries v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Com % 849 P.2d at 1174. 
Utah Admin. Code Rl 37-1-22 establishes the procedure for transcript production 
and the filing of Step 6 briefs. Particularly relevant to this appeal are subsections (1), 
(2)(a), and (2)(f) of R137-1-22 which provide: 
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(1) Transcript Production. The party appealing the CSRB hearing officer's 
evidentiary/step 5 decision to the board at the appellate/step 6 level shall order 
transcription of the evidentiary/step 5 hearing from the court reporting firm 
within ten working days upon receipt of acknowledgment of the appeal from 
the administrator. 
(2) Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board at step 6 is based upon the 
evidentiary record previously established by the CSRB hearing officer during 
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing. No additional or new evidence is permitted 
unless compelled by the board. 
(a) The appellant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of 
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 
30 calendar days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the 
administrator. Additionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of 
the appellant's brief. 
(f) The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for 
good cause as determined by the CSRB chair or vice-chair, or the administrator 
(emphasis added). 
Equally important to this appeal is Utah Admin. Code R137-l-18(8) which 
provides that "[t]he CSRB hearing officer may, upon a party's motion or upon the CSRB 
hearing officer's own motion, dismiss the grievance or appeal with due regard for the 
standard of excusable neglect according to R137-l-13(3) (emphasis added)." 
Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-13(3), in turn, establishes: 
[t]he standard of excusable neglect may be offered as a defense to lack of 
timeliness in processing a grievance or for not appearing at a scheduled 
proceeding (emphasis added)" Subsection (a) of the same rule provides that 
"[t]he administrator or appointed CSRB hearing officer shall determine the 
applicability of the excusable neglect standard on the basis of good cause." In 
sum, the CSRB officer or administrator must first determine whether there is 
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"good cause" to apply the "excusable neglect" standard. If good cause is 
found, the CSRB officer or administrator must then determine whether the 
party's failure to timely comply is a result of "excusable neglect." 
Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-2 defines "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of due 
diligence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at 
the proper time, not in consequence of the person's own carelessness, inattention, or 
willful disregard in the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of some 
unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident (emphasis added)." 
Taken together these provisions allow the CSRB to grant a party's motion for an 
extension for the filing of the party's brief if the party can establish "good cause" under 
R137-l-22(2)(f) and if the extension is sought before the deadline for filing the brief has 
elapsed. Conversely, if the deadline for filing has past, and the opposing party makes a 
motion for default or dismissal, the CSRB should grant the default or dismissal unless the 
CSRB determines that there is "good cause" to apply the "excusable neglect" standard 
and if "excusable neglect" is found to exist. 
The CSRB failed to apply these standards in its November 19, 2003 Order denying 
Appellant's request for default and granting the Agency's request for an extension of time. 
Furthermore, the CSRB made no mention of the "good cause" and "excusable neglect" 
standards in its January 27, 2004 "Denial of Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or 
Interlocutory Appeal." Only in its April 16, 2004 Step 6 Decision does the CSRB 
mention that it had "found" that the Agency's failure to timely fde its Step 6 brief was due 
Page 17 of 35 
to "excusable neglect/9 : 
The CSRB failed to comply with its own rules as set forth in the Utah Admin. 
Code. The Agency made no suggestion that its failure to timely file the Step 6 brief was 
due to excusable neglect; and the CSRB did not discuss the "excusable neglect" standard 
in its November 19, 2003 Order. Instead, the CSRB rubber-stamped the Agency's request 
for an extension without the slightest reservation. 
It is telling that the CSRB, in its April 16, 2004 Step 6 Decision, attempts to argue 
that it had already found "excusable neglect" as a basis for denying Appellant's request 
for default made in November 2003. Clearly, the CSRB was aware (or became aware by 
that time) that the Agency was required to prove "excusable neglect" in order to avoid 
default. But, the fact remains that the CSRB's November 19, 2003 Order made no 
mention o/"excusable neglect" and the Agency itself never asserted that defense at that 
stage. 
The Agency should have been required to establish that its failure to timely file was 
"not in consequence of the person's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in 
the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable 
hindrance or accident" as mandated by Utah Admin. Code R137-1-2. 
The CSRB's failure to follow its own rules in this instance was not "reasonable or 
rationale." The CSRB provides no explanation for its departure from the rules in its 
November 19, 2003 Order. Indeed, if the CSRB had properly considered the "excusable 
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neglect" standard, it would have had a difficult time finding that the Agency's failure to 
timely file was "in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or 
accident." As noted supra, Utah Admin. Code Rl 37-1-22 requires the filing of the Step 6 
brief within 30 calendar days from the date that the Step 5 transcript is received by the 
party appealing the Step 5 decision. The Agency had clear notice under Rl 37-1-22 when 
its Step 6 brief should have been filed. 
The various time constraints imposed by the Utah Admin. Code ensure the 
expeditious processing of grievances. By the time that the Step 5 hearing had concluded 
in this case, Appellant had been without employment for a considerable time and was 
struggling to financially support herself and her disabled daughter. Although the CSRB's 
decision to grant the Agency an additional 30 days to file its Step 6 brief may be 
insignificant to the Agency, this delay affected Appellant financially and emotionally. 
Because the CSRB has failed to follow its own internal rules and because there is 
no reasonable or rationale basis for departure from the rules in this instance, this Court 
should reverse the CSRB's decision to deny Appellant's request for default. Default 
should be granted, and the Step 5 hearing officer's decision should be reinstituted in full. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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IL THE CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S "MEMORANDUM 
OF SUPPLEMENTAL CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES AND DOCUMENTS 
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR 
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL" WAS UNTIMELY FILED AND THAT 
THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADDRESSED 
IN A PRIOR ORDER. 
A. Timeliness of Motions in the Utah Admin. Code. 
The Utah Admin. Code provides little guidance on the issue of the timeliness of 
motions. Rl 37-1 -2 defines "Motion" as "a request offered verbally or in writing for a 
ruling or to take some action." Rl37-1-6(2) requires that "[a]ll papers, memoranda, 
petitions, grievances, pleadings, briefs, Addendums, and written motions to be filed with 
the administrator must be filed in the CSRB Office, 1120 State Office Building, Capitol 
Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, within the time limits prescribed either by law, by these 
rules, or by order of the administrator, by the designated CSRB hearing officer, or the 
board's chair or vice-chair." 
The Utah Admin. Code permits parties to file "motions for summary judgment" 
(R137-1-2), "motions to dismiss" (R137-l-18(8)), "motions to conduct discovery" (R133-
1-18(12)), "motions to sequester witnesses" (R137-l-19(3)), and "motions for dismissal 
of an appeal" (Rl 37-1-22). However, the Utah Admin.Code has no counterpart to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7, nor does the Code resolve when a motion may be deemed untimely, or how 
such a determination should be made. 
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B. The CSRB wrongly refused to consider new information concerning 
the standard of "excusable neglect." 
As set forth in the "Statement of Facts" supra, neither the CSRB nor Ms. Moore 
had disclosed the existence of the September 8, 2003 letter or the October 8,2003 receipt 
of delivery of the Step 5 transcript to Appellant's counsel. After the CSRB denied 
Appellant's initial request for default in its November 19, 2003 Order, Appellant filed a 
"motion for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal" on December 5, 2003. 
[Addendum "7"]. Therein, Appellant argued that the Agency had been properly notified 
via email of the due date for its Step 6 brief and that the Agency had not shown 
"excusable neglect" for its failure to timely file. 
The Agency filed a memorandum in opposition to Appellant's "motion for 
reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal" on December 12, 2003. At that point, 
Appellant was unaware that the Agency had ordered the Step 5 transcript on September 8, 
2003 or that the CSRB had received a copy of the Agency's letter to Thacker & Co., 
establishing that the transcript had been ordered. Equally important is the fact that 
Appellant was also unaware of the delivery certificate proving that Ms. Moore's office 
received the Step 5 transcript on October 8, 2003. 
The CSRB denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration or interlocutory appeal 
on January 27, 2004. In denying Appellant's motion, the CSRB merely notes that "[a]fter 
carefully considering Grievant's request and thoroughly reviewing the file associated with 
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this matter, the Board HERBY DENIES Grievant's request for reconsideration. In 
addition, the Board is unaware of any rules governing interlocutory appeals at the Board 
level and therefore denies such an appeal." [Addendum "9"]. Again, the CSRB provides 
no analysis of the "excusable neglect" standard, or any other standard under which the 
Agency would be entitled to avoid the deadlines imposed by the Utah Admin Code. 
On January 26, 2004, the day before the Step 6 hearing, Appellant discovered the 
existence of September 8, 2003 letter from Ms. Moore's office to Thacker & Co., a copy 
of which was delivered to the CSRB. Appellant obtained a copy of the letter and a copy 
of the certificate of delivery of the Step 5 transcripl l< > Ms ll\ loore's office. 
That same day (January 26, 2004), Appellant's counsel prepared a "memorandum 
of supplemental controlling authorities and documents in support of Appellant's motion 
for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal." [Addendum " IV" | Therein, Appellant 
argued that the Agency had failed to comply with Rule 137-l-22(2)(a) of the Utah Admin. 
Code which provides that after receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar days 
to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administration. This new 
memorandum focused not on whether Ms. Moore received an email copy of the October 
10, 2003 scheduling order, but whether the Agency or the CSRB should have disclosed 
the September 8, 2003 letter and October 8, 2003 certificate of delivery of the Step 5 
transcript, and whether the Agency could reasonably claim "excusable neglect" when it 
was clear that the Agency had received the Step 5 transcripl mi October 8, 2003. 
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At the opening of the Step 6 hearing the following morning (January 27, 2004), 
Appellant's counsel requested a bifurcation of the hearing in order to allow a discussion 
of the Default Certificate, motion for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal and the 
memorandum of supplemental controlling authorities concerning the Agency's late filing. 
The CSRB agreed to allow respective counsel the opportunity to address the allegations 
of the untimely filing of the Agency's Step 6 brief. 
On April 16, 2004 the CSRB issued its Step 6 Decision. [Addendum "1"]. In 
footnote (1) of the decision, the CSRB attempts to explain its refusal to consider the new 
information discovered by Appellant and argued at the Step 6 hearing: 
At the beginning of the Board hearing, Grievant filed a Memorandum of 
Supplemental Controlling and Authorities and Documents in Support of 
Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. The Board 
finds that this memorandum constitutes a new motion and is untimely, and 
declines to consider it. The Board notes that the issue of the filing date of the 
Agency's brief has been previously addressed by the Board. The Board 
determined that the delay in filing the Agency's brief was due to excusable 
neglect. 
This statement contains several errors. First, even if the CSRB had a reasonable 
basis for deeming the supplemental memorandum to be a "new motion" (the CSRB does 
not provide any basis for this qualification), the fact remains that Appellant only became 
aware of the September 8, 2003 letter and October 8, 2003 delivery certificate on January 
26, 2004—the day before the Step 6 hearing. The Agency failed to send a copy of the 
September 8, 2003 letter to Appellant's counsel even though a copy was sent to the CSRB 
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(a violation of Utah Admin. Code Rl 37-1-6(d)). The Agency also failed to disclose that it 
had received a certificate of delivery of the Step 5 transcript Obviously, Appellant could 
not have presented the information contained in the supplemental memorandum at an 
early time because neither the Agency nor the CSRB chose to disclose the information. 
Second, the issue of the filing date had been previously addressed by the CSRB 
only in the context of the alleged missing email copy of the scheduling order. Ihe CSRB 
had not previously considered the evidence proving that Ms. Moore's office had ordered 
and received a copy of the transcript or how R137-l-22(2)(a) affected Ms. Moore's claim 
that she was not notified of any filing deadlines. 
Third, the CSRB had never determined that the Agency's delay in filing its Step 6 
brief was due to excusable neglect. As already discussed, the CSRB's November 19, 
2003 Order merely indicated that Appellant's request for default was denied because the 
CSRB was uncertain whether the Agency had received notice of the October 10, 2003 
scheduling order. The CSRB failed to apply the excusable neglect standard to the 
Agency's actions, or engage in any analysis of the matter. Moreover, the CSRB simply 
denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration in its January 27, 2004 decision. 
In sum, the CSRB summarily refused to consider any information supporting 
Appellant's request for default even when it was established that the information could not 
have been obtained at an earlier stage. More egregious, however, is the fact that the 
CSRB had information that supported Appellant's request for default, but which 
Page 24 of 35 
information was withheld from Appellant's counsel. 
C. Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error. 
Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error in refusing to 
consider the additional information contained in the supplemental memorandum. "The 
requirement of'substantial prejudice' in [Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)] manifests the 
legislature's intent that relief not be given for an agency error if the error was harmless." 
Stokes v. Board of Review of Indus. Com 'n of Utah, 832 P.2d 56 at 58 (internal citations 
omitted). 
In Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com *n, 814 P.2d at 584, 
the Court explained: 
[S]ection 63-46b-16(4) ensures that relief should not be granted when, 
although the agency committed error, the error was harmless. Indeed, the 
language of section 63-46b-16(4) is similar to language in rules of procedure 
and evidence dealing with harmless error. Given this similarity in language, 
we conclude that the legislature in enacting section 63-46b-16(4) intended that 
the same standard used for determining the harmfitlness of error in appeals 
from judicial proceedings should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under 
this standard, an error will be harmless if it is "sufficiently inconsequential that 
. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." 
In the instant case, the CSRB's finding that the supplemental memorandum was 
both untimely and redundant signficantly "affected the outcome of the proceedings." The 
supplemental memorandum was highly relevant inasmuch as it highlighted new, 
previously undisclosed information about Ms. Moore's ordering and receipt of the Step 5 
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hearing transcript. This new information was highly relevant to the question of whether 
or not the Agency had established "excusable neglect" and whether or not Ms. Moore 
should have been placed on notice of the Step 6 brief filing deadline by Utah Admin. 
CodeR137-l-22. 
D. This Court should find that the CSRB's ruling that Appellant's 
supplemental memorandum was untimely filed and that the issues 
raised therein had been previously resolved by prior order is arbitrary 
and capricious under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) allows an appellate court to grant a party 
relief from a final agency action if that action is arbitrary or capricious. In determining 
whether the Agency's action was arbitrary or capricious, the appellate court should apply 
the "reasonable and rational/intermediate" standard of review. Semeco Industries v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com % 849 P.2d at 1174. In fact, this Court has 
explained that an agency's "decisions must fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality. As used in this context, the words 'arbitrary and capricious' mean no more 
than this." Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah App. 
1988). 
There is no question that given the failure of the CSRB to initially apply the 
"excusable neglect" standard in its November 19, 2003 Order denying Appellant's request 
for default, the CSRB should have accepted Appellant's supplemental memorandum of 
points and authorities as timely filed. As previously explained, the day before the Step 6 
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hearing was when Appellant discovered the fact that the Agency had ordered the Step 5 
transcript on September 8, 2003, that the CSRB had received a copy of the Agency's letter 
verifying the order, and that Ms. Moore's office received a certificate of deliver of the 
Step 5 transcript on October 8, 2003. 
All of these facts have a direct bearing on the primary question: whether the 
Agency established, at any time, the defense of "excusable neglect" for its failure to timely 
file its Step 6 brief. Instead of considering this information, the CSRB attempted to cover 
its own error by finding that the supplemental memorandum was untimely filed and that 
the failure of the Agency to timely file its Step 6 brief had been "previously addressed." It 
is significant that in the same footnote, the CSRB states that it had previously determined 
that the "delay in filing the Agency's brief was due to excusable neglect." A review of the 
CSRB's November 19, 2003 Order and January 27, 2004 Order proves that no such 
finding was ever made. 
The CSRB received verification that the Agency had both ordered and received the 
Step 5 transcript. Appellant knew nothing of this until several months later. In the 
interim period, Appellant had filed a request for default and a motion for reconsideration 
of the CSRB's denial of the request for default. The CSRB conveniently made no 
mention of the fact that it had received confirmation of the order and receipt of the Step 5 
transcript by the Agency; and when this information was finally independently discovered 
by Appellant the day before the Step 6 hearing, the CSRB casually dismissed the matter 
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by saying that Appellant's supplemental memorandum was untimely and that the issues 
raised therein had already been resolved. 
The CSRB has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner (i.e. its actions were not 
reasonable and rationale). There was no reasonable basis for the CSRB to reject 
Appellant's supplemental memorandum as untimely or to try and cover its own error by 
alleging that it had already found that the /:\ gency's failure to time!) file was due to 
"excusable neglect" Although the CSRB functions as an administrative arm of the State of 
Utah, it should not be allowed to selectively enforce rules in order to favor another state 
entity. Such behavior only creates an appearance of bias on the part of the CSRB. 
Appellant therefore requests that this Court find tl lat the CSRB acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner by rejecting Appellant's supplemental memorandum on the basis that it 
was untimely and that the issues raised therein had already been previously addressed. 
Ill THE CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLAN I "l I li \ NIM UN I 11" 111 R 
POSITION. 
A, Appellant gave "proper notification" to her supervisors that she could 
not work the night shift and, therefore, did not abandon her position. 
Utah Admin. Code R477-12-2 defines "abandonment of position" as follows: 
Employees who are absent from work for three consecutive working days and are 
capable of providing proper notification of their supervisor, but do not, shall be 
considered to have abandoned their position. 
The Utah State Hospital's Operational Policy and Procedure Manual also contains 
a specific section governing absenteeism and tardiness ("Policy 23"). Policy 23 requires 
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direct patient care workers to provide telephonic notice at least two hours before a 
scheduled shift if the employee is unable to work that shift. Policy 23 requires the 
employee to call in every day of absence unless the employee has a doctor's note. Policy 
23 also provides that "calling off is to be used for "illness or extreme emergencies only 
(emphasis added)." Finally, Policy 23 indicates that if "an employee is a no call/no show 
for three consecutive days, it will be considered job abandonment by the employee and 
grounds for termination." 
The primary question at both the Step 5 and Step 6 hearings was whether 
Appellant, in fact, "abandoned" her position. As has already been noted in the Statement 
of Facts section of this brief, the Agency's own expert, Ms. Robin Arnold Williams 
(executive director of the Department of Human Services), stated during the Step 5 
hearing that Appellant did not have an illness or emergency at the time that she failed to 
present herself at work and that therefore, Policy 23 did not apply to Appellant's particular 
situation. Ms. Williams also testified that that an employee who informed a supervisor of 
her intent not to work a particular shift could be deemed to have given proper notification 
on an individual basis under DHRM R477-12-2. Accordingly, the Agency's own expert's 
opinion supports Appellant's contention that she did not abandon her position. 
All relevant testimony offered by Appellant and the Agency's witnesses at trial 
established that on February 19, 2003, Appellant repeatedly told three of her supervisors 
that she "would not and could not work" the newly assigned graveyard shift and that she 
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would not be at her shift on February 20, 2003. Appellant had a superb attendance record 
and so her declaration that she would not be at work for the February 20, 2003 graveyard 
shift was clear and unmistakable. Appellant had. onlj one da ;; ""s notice of the schedule 
change and could not reasonably make accommodations for her disabled daughter. 
Appellant did not have an "illness" or an "emergency" that required her to comply 
with Policy 23. Appellant's situation is not one where she mysteriously disappeared 
without calling in to report her absence. Appellant gave "proper" and unambiguous 
notice that she could not be at work and, thus, complied with R477-12-2. It is 
unreasonable to imply that after such clear and direct notice to her supervisors, Appellant 
actually abandoned her position. Appellant's supervisors were informed of her decision 
not to show to work. If anything, Appellant's verbal, face-to-face notice of her inability to 
show for her next shift was more direct and met a higher standard than the one imposed 
by Policy 23. 
B. Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error. 
Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the CSRB's error in finding that she 
"abandoned" her position. "The requirement of 'substantial prejudice' in [Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)] manifests the legislature's intent that relief not be given for an 
agency error if the error was harmless." Stokes v. Board of Review of Indus. Com 'n of 
Utah, 832 P.2d at 58 (internal citations omitted). 
In Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com fn, 814 P.2d at 584, 
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the Court explained: 
[S]ection 63-46b-16(4) ensures that relief should not be granted when, 
although the agency committed error, the error was harmless. Indeed, the 
language of section 63-46b-16(4) is similar to language in rules of procedure 
and evidence dealing with harmless error. Given this similarity in language, 
we conclude that the legislature in enacting section 63-46b-16(4) intended that 
the same standard used for determining the harmfulness of error in appeals 
from judicial proceedings should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under 
this standard, an error will be harmless if it is "sufficiently inconsequential that 
. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." 
In the instant case, the CSRB's error in finding that Appellant "abandoned" her 
employment significantly "affected the outcome of the proceedings." Clearly, if the 
CSRB had relied upon the evidence of the Agency's own expert witness (Ms. Williams), 
and the testimony of Appellant and other witness testimony provided during the Step 5 
hearing, the CSRB could have reached no other reasonable conclusion than that Appellant 
gave proper notification of her intent to be absent from work. 
C. This Court should find that in finding that Appellant "abandoned" her 
position, the CSRB "erroneously interpreted or applied the law" and 
that Appellant is entitled to relief under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4¥d). 
This Court should reverse the CSRB's legal conclusion that Appellant 
"abandoned" her position and grant Appellant relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(d). Because this Court grants "no deference" to the CSRB in reviewing its 
interpretation and application of law, this Court may consider R477-12-2 and Policy 23 
and apply those rules to the undisputed facts in this case. 
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Appellant was fully aware of the language contained in Policy 23. Because she had 
unequivocally told three of her supervisors at the February 19, 2003 meeting that she 
would be unable to be present at her newly scheduled graveyard shift, Appellant believed 
that her notice was sufficient. Appellant's belief that she was providing "proper notice" 
was reasonable given the circumstances. Appellant did not have an emergency situation, 
nor was she ill. Therefore, it was unnecessary for Appellant to call in to work to notify 
her supervisors that she would not show to work. 
The CSRB's conclusion that Appellant "abandoned" her employment rests upon a 
technicality—that Appellant did not telephone call on the evenings she was scheduled for 
work. Given Appellant's exemplary attendance and work record and her vehemence 
concerning her inability to work the graveyard shift, the CSRB should have concluded 
that Appellant provided proper notification of her intent not to be at work for the 
graveyard shift. 
Appellant requests that this Court properly and equitably consider Appellant's 
behavior and actions in this case. Appellant did not intend to abandon her position, and 
her supervisors knew that she was distraught over the new schedule. This Court should 
find that Appellant did comply with R477-12-2 by providing "proper notification" to her 
supervisors. This Court should also find that Policy 23 did not apply to Appellant in this 
particular situation because she did not have an emergency or illness to report and because 
she already gave reasonable verbal notice to her supervisors. This Court should find that 
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the CSRB erred in finding that Appellant "abandoned" her employment. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The CSRB erred in not requiring the Agency to prove "excusable neglect" for 
failure to timely file its Step 6 brief Additionally, the CSRB found "excusable neglect" 
despite the fact that the Agency never initially asserted such a position and despite the fact 
that the Agency had clear notice under Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(2)(a) that its brief 
was due 30 days after it received the Step 5 hearing transcript. This Court should find 
that the CSRB failed to comply with its own internal rules and reverse the CSRB's 
finding of "excusable neglect." The Step 6 proceedings and Step 6 Decision should be 
stricken, and the Step 5 Decision should be reinstituted. 
The CSRB erred in refusing to consider Appellant's supplemental memorandum on 
the basis that it was "untimely" and that the issues raised therein had already been 
resolved by an earlier CSRB order. This Court should find that the supplemental 
memorandum was timely, and relevant to the issue of whether or not the Agency could 
establish "excusable neglect" for failure to timely file its Step 6 brief. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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This Court should reverse the ruling of the CSRB at Step 6 on the question of 
"abandonment." This Court should find that Appellant did not "abandon" her position 
and that therefore, her termination was unwarranted. Appellant's employment shouk 
reinstated. 
.A-
Respectfully submitted this £__ day of October, 2004 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN, 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
1. Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action 
2. February 25, 2003 Letter of Termination from Mark Payne to Royene Aitken 
3. Step 5 Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw, Decision and Order 
4. October 10, 2003 Scheduling Order from Robert Thompson 
5. November 18, 2003 Letter from Debra Moore 
6. November 19, 2003 CSRB Order on Default Certificate 
7. Royene Aitken's "Motion for Reconsideration of for Interlocutory Appeal" 
8. Utah Department of Human Service's "Memorandum in Opposition to motion 
for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal" 
9. CSRB's "Denial of Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory 
Appeal." 
10. CSRB's "Notice of Administrative Appeal Hearing Before the Board" 
11. September 8, 2003 Letter from Debra Moore's office requesting Step 5 hearing 
transcript 
12. October 8, 2003 Receipt of Delivery of Step 5 hearing transcript 
13. Royene Aitken's "Memorandum of Supplemental and Controlling Authorities 
in Support of Grievanfs Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory 
Appeal" 
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ADDENDUM 1 
O R I G I N A L 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
DECISION 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
CaseNos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22 CSRB/H.0.316 (Step 5) 
On Friday, February 20, 2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an 
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair, Joan M. Gallegos, 
and Felix J. McGowan. Ms. Royene Aitken (Grievant) was present and represented by 
Justin D. Heideman, Attorney at Law, who presented oral argument on Grievant's behalf with 
Patrick J. Ascione, Attorney at Law, also present at the Grievant's table. Assistant Attorney General 
Debra J. Moore represented the Department of Human Services (Department and DHS) with 
David Gardner, Human Resources Director for the Utah State Hospital, present as the Department's-
management representative. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-19a-101-408 of the 
State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act (USPMA). The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R137-1-1 to -23. This Board hearing, or Step 6 appeal hearing, is the final step of 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Ms. Aitken's 
appeal of the denial of her grievance. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 
proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to Rl 37-1-18(2)(a). Therefore, those 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to formal adjudications 
are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-46b et seq. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Grievant worked as a nurse on the Children's Unit of the Utah State Hospital in Provo, Utah. 
On February 19,2003, Grievant was informed that she would be transferred to the Geriatric Unit on 
the following day. On February 20,2003, Grievant did not report to work, nor did Grievant report 
for work on subsequent days. On February 25, 2003, the Agency informed Grievant that her 
employment was terminated based on abandonment of position. 
Grievant appealed the termination to Robin Arnold-Williams, Executive Director, Utah 
Department of Human Services, who sustained the termination on March 19, 2003, Grievant then 
appealed to the CSRB. On Wednesday, August 12,2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before 
Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Grievant was represented by 
Justin D. Heideman, Ascione, Heideman and McKay, LX.C, Provo, Utah. The Utah Department of 
Human Services (Department or DHS) was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Laurie L. Noda. Certified Court Reporter Kerry Sorensen, RPR, Thacker & Co., L.L.C., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, made a verbatim record of the proceedings. 
On August 29,2003, the Hearing Officer issued a written decision and order. Aitken v. Utah 
Dep't of Human Services, 22 CSRB/H.O. 316. The Hearing Officer ruled that the Agency met its 
burden to show that Grievant abandoned her position. Applying standards for a disciplinary 
separation, the Hearing Officer considered whether the Agency demonstrated that Grievant's 
dismissal was <6to advance the good of the public service" or "for just cause/' and ruled that the 
Agency had not met that burden. Thus, the Hearing Officer rescinded the termination of Grievant5 s 
employment with the Agency. Notwithstanding, the Hearing Officer concluded that Grievant 
knowingly violated an Agency policy, to wit, Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, Section 23, Utah State 
Hospital Operational Policy and Procedure Manual. As a penalty for the policy violation, the 
Hearing Officer ordered that Grievant be demoted one pay step, retroactively effective on 
February 25, 2003. 
The Agency appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision and Order to the Board. Grievant filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration or Interlocutory Appeal, which was denied by the Board.l The Agency 
1
 Atthe beginning of the Board hearing, Grievant filed a Memorandum of Supplemental Controlling 
Authorities and Documents in Support of Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. 
The Board finds that this memorandum constitutes a new motion and is untimely, and declines to consider 
it. Thfc Board notes that the issue of the filing date of the Agency's brief has been previously addressed by 
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also asked the Board to dismiss Grievant's grievance for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that Grievant 
voluntarily resigned from her position.2 The Board considered the Agency's appeal from the Hearing 
Officer's Decision and Order, and the Agency's Motion to Dismiss, at the hearing held Friday, 
February 20,2004. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING 
The Step 5 hearing in the instant matter was held on August 12, 2003. The Board is 
authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing by UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-406. Because the 
Agency alleged abandonment of position, the Agency bore the burden of showing abandonment by 
substantial evidence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-406(2)(a). 
The Hearing Officer framed the issues as follows: first, whether Grievant abandoned her 
position; second, if Grievant did abandon her position, is termination the appropriate remedy, or 
should a lesser penalty be imposed. The Hearing Officer found that Grievant did abandon her 
position. He then considered the employment termination on the basis of abandonment as a 
"dismissal" and applied UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(1), which requires that a dismissal be to 
"advance the good of the public service" or for "just cause." 
Five witnesses testified on behalf of the Agency, and four witnesses, including Grievant, 
testified on behalf of Grievant. One witness was qualified as an expert in the interpretation of 
Agency policies pertaining to notification of an intended absence from work. The Hearing Officer 
heard testimony concerning whether Grievant had provided notice that she would not work her shift 
on the appointed day, following the transfer to the Geriatric Unit. Further testimony addressed 
whether Grievant had "called-off," or notified the Agency that she would not report for work, on the 
the Board. The Board determined that the delay milling the Agency's brief was due to excusable neglect. 
The Board then imposed a filing deadline for the Agency, which the Agency met. It appears from the 
Board's file that Grievant received a fax copy of the briefing schedule, but no fax copy was sent to the 
Agency. Though it has been the Board's usual practice to electronically mail a briefing schedule to agencies 
who subscribe to the Utah state email system, there is no record that the briefing schedule was sent by email 
to the Agency. To the extent that the misunderstanding of briefing dates may be a result of Board procedure, 
the Board will ensure against recurrences by providing fax or mail notice of the briefing schedule to all 
parties. 
2
 An employee who voluntarily resigns from state employment may not file a grievance over 
termination of employment with the Board; UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19*401(6). 
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following days. 
Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Hearing Officer found that Grievant did not appear at her assigned post on February 20, 
2003, or on the following two scheduled workdays, Friday, February 21, 2003, and Monday, 
February 24,2003. The Hearing Officer also found that Grievant was aware that she was obligated 
by policy to call and notify a supervisor on each day that Grievant did not intend to report for work. 
Thus, the Hearing Officer concluded that Grievant abandoned her position. 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The only appeal of the Step 5 Decision and Order was taken by the Agency.3 The Agency 
first asks the Board to dismiss the grievance prior to considering the merits of the issues on appeal. 
The Agency asserts that Grievant actually voluntarily resigned from her position, thus depriving 
Grievant of the opportunity to file a grievance with the Board. The Agency cites to the words spoken 
by Grievant at the time that she protested her transfer to the Geriatric Unit, as well as Grievant's 
testimony in the Step 5 hearing, to support its contention that this is actually a case of voluntary 
resignation. Grievant counters that the Agency did not treat her statements at the time of Ihe transfer 
as evidence of an intent to resign. 
In the Agency's substantive appeal before this Board, the Agency challenges the Hearing 
Officer's analysis subsequent to his finding of abandonment of position. The Agency contests 
application of the standard of whether the employment termination is to "advance the good of the 
public service" or for "just cause." The Agency contends that standard applies only to "dismissals" 
from public employment, and that abandonment of position leads to an employment separation that 
cannot be characterized as a "dismissal." 
The Agency further contends that the Hearing Officer erred in the substitution of a demotion 
for the employment termination. The Agency asserts that the Hearing Officer had no authority to 
modify the termination decision because this was not a dismissal. The Agency further complains 
that assuming the Hearing Officer could modify the termination decision, the Hearing Officer did 
3
 Much of Grievanfs brief on the Step 6 hearing is framed as a challenge, in the vernacular of an 
appeal, of the Hearing Officer's finding that Grievant abandoned her position. Grievant never filed a notice 
of appeal of the Step 5 Decision and Order and is thus estopped from substantively challenging the finding 
of abandonment of position. See In re Schwenke, 494 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18, 2004 WL 330254 (February 24, 
2004); Vihn Do v. Utah Dep't of Human Services, 6 CSRB 54 (1995) (declining to address due process 
claims not appealed from the Step 5 Decision and Order). 
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not give the requisite deference to the Agency's decision to terminate on the basis of abandonment 
of position. 
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Board applies the appellate standard mandated by UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
R137-l-22(4)(a)-(c) which reads: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual findings, 
{b'j Once che board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon this standard of review, the Board first determines whether the Hearing Officer' s 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence "is that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995), quoting First National 
Bank v. County Bd of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); see also Grace Drilling v. 
Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63,68 (Utah App. 1989). "It is more than a mere' scintilla' of evidence 
and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Comm % 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). 
Next, the Board reviews the fact finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer 
correctly applied "the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," 
giving no deference to the Hearing Officer's legal conclusions. The Board ultimately considers 
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whether the decision of the Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon the Board's 
determination of the facts, together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and 
statutes considered by the Hearing Officer. 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L WHETHER GRIEVANT VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED 
AND THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
The Agency urges dismissal of the grievance on the grounds that Grievant's actions and 
spoken words indicate an intent to voluntarily resign. The Agency relies on statements made at the 
February 19, 2003, meeting at which Grievant was told of her impending reassignment to the 
Geriatric Unit. Specifically, the Agency asserts that the following cited dialogue evidences the intent 
to resign: 
Q. In the past have you ever gone to a boss and said, "I quit"? 
A. (Grievant): No. 
Tr. 307, lines 5-7. 
Q. And when you said that you couldn't and wouldn't work that 
shift, had you ever said that before? 
A. (Grievant): No. 
Tr. 308, lines 8-12.4 
The Agency further cites to the action of Diane Maciel in escorting Grievant from the 
meeting site to her work place to retrieve some personal items, suggesting that an escort from the 
premises is consistent with a resignation. See Tr. 320, lines 20-25; Tr. 321, lines 18-21. Grievant 
counters that it was she who requested an escort from Ms. Maciel, because she was comfortable with 
Ms. Maciel. Tr. 320, lines 20-25. Neither interpretation of the event is clear from the record. 
However, there was no testimony from the witnesses that Ms. Maciel accompanied Grievant to 
retrieve personal items because Ms. Maciel believed that an escort was necessary or advisable, or 
because Ms. Maciel had been instructed by hospital officials to provide the escort. In her own 
4
 Grievant asserts that these words, and related similar statements, are "relevant to determine the 
issue of abandonment, but. . , unrelated to the question of whether Grievant resigned her position." We 
disagree. Grievant has not appealed the Step 5 decision that she abandoned her position. Notwithstanding, 
as explained below, we consider the issue of abandonment in the context of whether the Agency actually 
regarded Grievant to have abandoned her position, or to have voluntarily resigned. The two possibilities are 
dependent on many of the same facts, 
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testimony, Ms. Maciel confirmed Grievant's claim that Grievant asked Ms, Maciel to accompany 
her. Tr. 176, lines 17-21. 
The Agency cites to several cases decided by the Board. Each is distinguishable. In Bancroft 
v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, J.K 104 (1998), the grievant resigned in the face of impending 
termination after an investigation into his driver license status and suspected misuse of prescription 
medication. The grievant signed a letter of resignation, was accompanied to his home to retrieve a 
state-owned automobile, and required to surrender keys and official identification cards. Further, 
the grievant sent an agent to clean out personal effects from his desk on the following day. Not only 
were the indicia of resignation unequivocal, but the parties all understood that the resignation was 
in lieu of certain disciplinary termination. 
In Donald Larsen v Utah State Prison, 1 PRB 9 (1982), the Board found that the grievant 
had tendered a verbal resignation during a telephone conversation with his supervisor. The grievant 
discussed his intention of quitting, converting accrued compensatory and annual leave to a cash 
payment, and of signing a resignation letter. The grievant did not return to work, and shortly 
thereafter obtained other employment. In Larsen, the Board found that the grievant had tendered 
his resignation on November 13, and had failed to retract his resignation on the next working day, 
November 16. On December 2, the grievant's accrued annual leave was exhausted, and prison 
officials began the three day count for abandonment of position. In the interim, the grievant spoke 
with his former supervisor about "getting his old job back," as he was not happily employed in his 
new position. Prison officials notified the grievant that his employment was terminated and declined 
to rehire him. In ruling that the grievant had effectively resigned on November 13, the Board 
considered his inquiry to human resource staff concerning cash payment for accrued leave and 
accrued compensatory time, his removal of all of his personal items from the workplace a week 
before the November 13 telephone resignation, as well as the fact of the tendered resignation itself. 
The factors present in the Larsen decision are not before the Board in the present case. The 
evidence of a verbal resignation consists of ambiguous statements by the Grievant, and the removal 
of personal items.5 This cannot equate to the desk cleaning a week prior to an oral resignation, 
Both in argument and in written memorandum, Grievant5 s counsel claimed that Grievant retrieved 
only some personal items, and had not turned in keys or identification badges, and that Grievant left some 
personal items at the work place. Though Grievant does not support this claim by citation to the record, we 
do not find the single element of removing personal items to be the sole, or even most persuasive, evidence 
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benefit inquiries, and unambiguous tender of resignation bolstered by new employment in Larsen. 
In the final case cited, Betty Jo Jensen, PhR, v. Utah State Office of Education, J.H. 33 
(1988), the issue was not whether the grievant had resigned or not, but whether the resignation was 
withdrawn in a timely manner. Though the grievant claimed that the resignation was involuntary, 
the strong weight of the evidence was contrariwise. In Jensen, there was a detailed written 
resignation stating that the resignation was voluntary, and requesting two months of administrative 
leave as part of the resignation document. The administrative leave had apparently been the subject 
of discussion and negotiation for some period prior to the written resignation. This is simply not the 
case in the instant matter and the Jensen decision is of no support to the Agency. 
Though the Agency would now have the Board find that Grievant resigned, the Agency's 
conduct in the days and weeks following February 19, 2003, is illuminating. The Agency treated 
Grievant's action as an abandonment of position, not as a resignation. The Agency did not notify 
Grievant that her resignation had been accepted and was therefore effective. Rather, the Agency sent 
Grievant notice that it was exercising its prerogative under Rule 477-12-2 to terminate Grievanfs 
employment See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-12-2 (1) (Supp. 2003) (abandonment of position). 
The Agency notified Grievant of her right to appeal the termination decision to the Executive 
Director of the Department of Human Services. This appeal right, articulatedin UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
R477-12-2(l)(a)> applies not to resignations, but to terminations due to abandonment of position. 
In fact, Grievant did unsuccessfully appeal her termination to the Agency Executive Director. The 
record illustrates that the Executive Director considered Grievant's circumstance an abandonment, 
and not a resignation. Tr. 35-37; 46-49.6 
Grievant's words and actions, though susceptible to alternative interpretations, did not 
of a resignation in the cases cited by the Agency. 
6
 Grievant argues that the Board should look to the Agency's present counsel's "lack of familiarity 
with the historical context of the case" as a key -and insufficient- basis for the Agency's request to dismiss 
the grievance. The Board notes that the Agency argues the notion of a voluntary resignation for the first time 
in its motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, any party may assert a lack of jurisdiction by the Board over a 
grievance. It is axiomatic that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time during adjudicative proceedings. 
State v. Valdez, 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah 2003); see also Varian-Eimac, Jna v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss 
the [matter]/'). 
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constitute a voluntary resignation.7 The Agency did not consider Grievant's action a resignation and 
did not act consistent with a voluntary resignation. The Agency complied with the procedure for 
addressing an abandonment of position. We hold that Grievant did not voluntarily resign her 
employment. 
II. WHETHER THE HEARING OFFICER ERRED BY ORDERING 
DEMOTION IN LIEU OF TERMINATION 
The Hearing Officer concluded that the facts of the case, measured against the applicable rule 
and Step 5 and Step 6 precedent, mandated a finding of abandonment of position. The Agency 
asserts that abandonment of position is not a "dismissal," and because there was no dismissal the just 
cause standard cannot apply to this case. Thus, the Agency asks the Board to sustain the termination 
of Grievant's employment. The Agency also contests the Hearing Officer's lack of deference to the 
Agency's discretionary decision to terminate Grievant's employment. 
Though Grievant did not appeal the Step 5 determination that she abandoned her position, 
our task is to examine whether "the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational according to the substantial evidence standard." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R137-l-22(4)(a) 
(Supp. 2003). Accordingly, we review the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Grievant abandoned 
her position to guide our determination of whether the just cause standard of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 67-19-18(1) applies to the instant case. 
Grievant advances two arguments counter to the conclusion that she abandoned her position. 
First, Grievant asserts that the call-off policy did not apply to her circumstances. Second, as 
previously noted, Grievant requests that her words "I quit" should be coupled with her warning to 
hire an attorney, as well as her claim that she could not work under the conditions of her transfer, 
and be interpreted as notice that she would not report for work for purposes of the call-off policy, 
but not be interpreted that she would not report for work because she quit. 
The Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, § 23, Utah State Hospital Operational Policy and 
Procedure Manual, generally referred to as the "call-off policy, requires direct patient care workers 
to give telephonic notification at least two hours before a scheduled shift if the worker could not 
7
 We note the Agency's citation to the rule that expressly bars submission of affidavits and 
additional evidence unless compelled by the Board. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R377-1-22 (2). In reaching the 
conclusion that Grievant did not resign, we rely only on the record of the Step 5 hearing. Thus, we need not 
address the Agency's request to strike Grievant's affidavit. 
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report for the shift. The policy also requires the employee tc» :: all in each and every 
absence. The two-hour buffer is necessary for the Hospital to accommodate its mission to provide 
direct patient care. Order, Conclusions of Law, f 6; Tr, 196-198. 
Grievant .notes the plain language of the call-off policy to state its applicability to "illness 
and extreme emergeru *. situations onh ' -r,t-' am parse- witn* e h/js *i;^  tesunv-nviu argue fl--
the call-off policy does not apply when a worker will be absent for any reason other than an illness 
or extreme emergency. Thus, Grievant asserts that she was not obligated to notify the Hospital that 
she did not intend to report for work, since her intended absence was not due to an "illness" or an 
"extreme emergency." 
akin- J-. i* r !• - 'P - <Mj*t;-«t:n», .>MU OtiU cS* t e s tmiu iA it i * Hot s jppui levJ 
by substantial evidence and is not consistent with a fair reading of the hearing record. Grievant's 
proposed interpretation of the call-off policy leads to logical absurdity. For example, no call-off 
would be mandated if a worker learned that fish were biting on a particular body of water, and the 
worker's love of fishing prompted a day of angling when the worker was scheduled to provide 
patient care. A more sensible reading of the policy is to take it at face value. Reading the policy in 
the context ol the availability of previously schedule I \ ,u atior. :a> >\ :i> well as the critical mission 
of'the Hospital, it is apparent that patient care \u>r UT- ,-re ewo.-i ' " ^ - -p *-r* •- *.«.!. and -r* -?xy 
scheduled shift, absent a sudden illness or an extreme emergency. 
We now consider the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Grievant abandoned her employment 
position. The Hearing Officer found: 
Grievant was informed that she was to report to her new work assignment 
the following day, Thursday, February 20,2003, at 1800 hours (6:00 p.m.). 
Grievant did not present herself for work on February 20,2003, nor on the 
following two scheduled workdays of Friday, February 21, 2003, and 
Monday, February 24, 2003. Grievant did not call in or "call-off* within 
two hours in each instance in accordance with written hospital policy, 
Order, Findings of Fact, ffif 2 (c); 3. 
"-'" • *'- :.•. ' . ! :L' wonsciipl imdb ^u'^uiu'wi . , 'we to>upporteach iau u u „ ;.. 
the preceding paragraph. Chris Metcalf testified that she gave Grievant direct instructions to report 
to work at the Geriatric Unit on February 20,2003. Tr. 153-156. Francesco Lepore offered the same 
testimony. Tr 90. Chris Metcalf testified that Grievant did not report for work on February 20, 
2003, or the two following scheduled work days. Tr. 198-201. Grievant testified that she could have 
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called to state that she did not intend to report on any of the three work days. 1: . ^ ^ . 
Grievant asserts that the words that she used on February 19, 2003, put her supervisors on 
notice that she would not report for work as long as she was scheduled for midnight shifts in the 
(ien.i'ix - I*' 1 '^ * j'vmriL * >ri:i.oi, who heard extensive testimony about the tone and tenor of the 
Grievant's statements, considered .lii''rejected (JriL^ant . t that she had u^ » > 'ewi,i*-\ 
notice that she would not report for work. We note that Grievant has argued that those same words 
must be considered in the context of Grievant's previous behavior, where she "had, on previous 
occasions, threatened to 'quit' when she was frustrated, but those threats were made when she was 
upset .and did not reflect an actual intent to resign." Grievant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Agency's Motion to Dismiss Grievance for I ,ack of Jurisdiction at 8 See alsc >, Fi 2.66-267. 
Notwithstanding, both Diane Maciel and Chris Metcalf appeared not to take Grievant's statement 
that she would not be at work on February 20, 2003, as more than an emotional outburst. 
11. 164-176; 180-183. Grievant characterizes her own words not as a clear and unambiguous 
indication that she would quit, but as an emotional threat to resign. Grievant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Grievance for Lack of Jurisdiction at 8. 
The Hearing Officer sat as feet-finder; facing the witnesses and observing non-verbal 
communication, as well as the intonation and emotion of the spoken testimony. He was faced with 
weighing whether or not Grievant's words of February 19, 2003, gave notice of a sincere intent to 
not report for work as assigned on February 20, 2003, in light of the context and emotion of the 
meeting. The Hearing Officer heard conflicting testimony over not only the intent8 of those words, 
but the actual words spoken.9 We find that substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's 
determination that Grievant did not give the notice required b) the Hospital's call-off policy, and, 
consequently that Grievant had abandoned her position I :L Ui : ? ^>; 198-201; 336-337; Order;, 
Findings ofFact,ffil 2(c); 3. 
8
 We note that UTAH ADMIN. CODE 477-12-2(1 )(b) states that the Agency is not required to show 
Grievant's intent to abandon her position. 
9Grievant states that she "did notify her supervisors without qualification that she would not show 
up to work the graveyard shift because of her disabled daughter's needs." Grievant does not cite to the 
record to support this argument. We note that the record is far from clear on whether Grievant discussed her 
daughter in the meeting where she stated that she would not comply with the new assignment and schedule. 
See Tr. 80<81; 154-157; 180-182, 
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We must now determine whether the Hearing Officer properly ordered demotion of Grievant 
as a remedy for abandonment of position. The Hearing Officer noted Grievant's stated personal 
challenges, both in working with geriatric patients and with working night shifts. The Hearing 
Officer considered the root cause of the employment termination as Grir-- .u:t\ failure1 to pmit\ ! 
Ho;>nM •" 'iiS'-ic:-. a ' i . • i J« : • "in j . . . .M. - iJaid 
Career service employees may be "dismissed" only to "advance the good of the public 
service"or for "just causes, . such as misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance in office." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(1) (2003). A "dismissal" is defined as "a separation from state employment 
for cause" UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-1 (43). The language of I: • AH OJDI- ANN.§ 67~:<M8, 
demonstrates that the just cause statute is intended to apply c u v Ji.^iFlinstr> dismissals and 
demotions. See UTAH CODE A NN § 67 19- 18(3) (2003) (director to establish procedural rules for 
"disciplinary dismissals and demotions"). 
We hold that a "dismissal," as used in § 67-19-18(1), is a disciplinary action, not merely a 
separation of employment. The procedures for dismissing an employee are detailed in UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE R477-11. An entirely separate rule, UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-12, addresses three non-
disciplinary foims of employment separation, . >- ^ ^ , ; u . • - *h v^u nment of position, and 
reduction of force. Each of these forms of employment separation are n«^  i u* cause" and thus are 
not "dismissals." Grievant was not "dismissed" from employment. Thus, the Hearing Officer erred 
in applying the just cause standard to the instant matter. 
Because we find that Grievant's employment termination was not subject to the just cause 
standard, we hold that the Hearing Officer erred in finding an abuse of discretion by the Agency. 
Order, Conclusions of Law, •  Though the decision, to tei n i inatc employment followin g an 
abandonment of position is indeed discretionary, the discretion firmly rests with the Agency.10 UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R477-12-2(1 .)> Even if the Board were to find the employment action imposed by a 
State agency to be harsh, we are limited in our power to substitute our judgment for the agency's 
decision. Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P,2d 933, 942 
(Utah 1997) ("CSRB is restricted to determining whether... fan agency's] sanction of dismissal is 
We note that the hearing testimony was, unambiguous concerning prior cases of abandonment of 
position within the Agency. The Agency has consistently exercised its prerogative to terminate employment 
in similar circumstances. Tr. 48-49, 
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Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70, 72-72 (Utah App. 1994). 
Though the decision to terminate employment should not be casually reached, the Board 
notes that Grievant failed to report for work involving direct patient care of institutionalized persons 
.\ Mrr-M*' 'v ^ ^!WUIK i-i )>(,•(,,• M- s.ii )KU .^-. nib fairly fits within the long-recognized 
legal concept of nonfeasance ol i-.-u *• - >xst/w,\ 6^ Ma> H^, JM :_ 3 Ciay 309/3! ! t l S ^ i 
("Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do. ) Certainly, it must be said 
that a licensed health care professional ought to report for caring for ill patients, absent a legitimate 
excuse or emergency. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(1 )(b) (just cause for dismissal includes 
"nonfeasance i n office") 
DECISION 
We find that Grievant did not resign her employment. Accordingly, we deny the Agency's 
motion to dismiss. The Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law that Grievant abandoned her position 
is sustained. Because the Grievant abandoned her position, the Agency had the discretionary option 
to terminate her employment. The just cause analysis is not applicable to a termination for 
abandonment of position. We sustain the Agency's termination of Grievant 5s employment. 
1)„ iTKIJ
 :;.. . mi day of April , 2(30 1 
DECISION U N A N I M O U S 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J, McGowan, Member 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency 
action by complying with UTAH ADMIN. CODE R137-l-22(10) and UTAH CODE ANN § 63-46b-13, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action 
pursuant to UTAH ADMIN.'CODE R137-1-11, and UTAH CODE Ann. § 63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 16th day of April 2004, (1)1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the 
foregoing Decision and Final Agency Action in the matter of Royene Aitken v. Utah Department 
of Human Services to the following: 
Royene Aitken 
170 West 1600 North 
Orem UT 84057-2645 
(2) I sent an E-mail of the original document to the following: 
Robin Arnold-Williams 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
RARNOLD@utah.gov 
David Gardner 
Human Resource Manager 
Utah State Hospital 
DGARDNER@utah.goy 
Debra J. Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
DEBRAMOORE@utah£nv 
(3) I faxed a copy of the original document to the following: 
Mark I. Payne 
Superintendent 
Utah State Hospital 
MPAYNE@utah.gov 
Rosanne Ricks 
Human Resource Manager 
Office of Human Resources 
Utah Department of Human Services 
RRJCKS@utah.gov 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L;C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604-3863 
801.374,1724 
Debra J, JMoore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
80h366MM 
Claudia L. Jones r 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 2 
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS MICHAEL O. L E A 
Executive Director Governor 
Utah Department of Human 
Services 
MARKLFAYNE 
Superintendent 
Utah State Hospital 
February 26, 2003 
Royene Aitken 
170 west 1600 North 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Our Ms Aitken, 
This letter is to inform you of my decision to terminate your employment from the Utah State Hospital 
effective February 25,2003, in accordance with the State of Utah DHRM Rule R477-12-2 Abandonment 
of Position 
Employees who are absent from work for three consecutive working days and are capable of 
providing proper notification to their supervisor, but do not, shall be considered to have 
abandoned their position, 
(1) Management may terminate an employee who has abandoned his position, 
Management shall inform the employee of the action in writing. 
(a) The employee shall have the right to appeal to the agency head within five 
working days of receipt or delivery of the notice of abandonment to the last 
known address. 
(b) if the termination action is appealed, management may not be required to 
prove intent to abandon the position. 
You were scheduled to .work February 20, 2003, February 21; 2003 and February 24, 2003, You were 
made aware of your schedule by the Director of Nursing. All attempts to reach you have failed. 
You have five working days from receipt or delivery of this letter to appeal this decision in writing. Your 
appeal should be directed to Robin Arnold-Williams, Executive Director,, Department of Human Services. 
Sincerely, 
Mark I Payne 
Superintendent 
Utah State Hospital 
dig 
Utah! 
RANDALL B ACHMAN 
Director 
Division o ! Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant, 
i s 
UTAH DEPARTMENT 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
CaseNo.22CSRB/H.O-316 
tearing Officer: Mark E. Kleinfield 
THE STEP 5 HEARING in the above-entitled case was held on August 12,2003, at the State 
Office Building, Room 1112, on Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, 1 Jtah, before, Mark B, Kleinfield, 
Career Service Review Boa.nl (CSRB or Board"* Hearing Officer Ms. Royene Aitken (Grievant) 
was present and represented by her counsel, Justin D. Heideman, Ascione, Heideman and 
McKay, L I C Provo. Utah. The Utah Department of Human Services (Department or DHS) was 
represented by Assistant-Attorney General Laurie • L. 1 loda.. Certified Court Reporter. 
Kerry Sorenson, Thacker & Co., L.L.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, made a verbatim record of the 
proceedings. Witnesses (five for the Department1 and five for the Grievant2) were placed under 
• oath, and testimony and documentary evidence3 (seven exhibits for the Department and four exhibits ' 
tin die Grievant) were received into Ihr iei rd The Hearing Officer permitted the filing of 
simultaneous post-hearing briefs by the close of business, 5:00 p.m., August 22, 2003. The 
Department filed a timely brief No brief was filed by the Grievant. 
1
 Department witnesses (in order): Robin Arnold-Williams, Dennis Cultimore, Francesco LePore Diane Maciel and 
Chris Metcalf 
2Grievant witnesses (in order): Anna Johnson, John Mayer, Shirlene Lambert, Stephanie Lindbalm and 
Royene Aitken, 
' S I I 14^' oj hxhifiils . 
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HAVING REVIEWED the documentary evidence, testimony, and the Department's 
post-hearing brief, the Hearing Officer as Presiding Officer (Utah Code, Section 63-46b-2(l)(h)) 
now makes and enters his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision as follows: 
AUTHORITY 
The authority for the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold a Step 5 evidentiary 
hearing is found at Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 and Utah Administrative Code, Rl37-1-21. 
ISSUES 
1. Did Grievant abandon her position? 
2. a. If Grievant did abandon her position, was dismissal the appropriate penalty? 
b. If not, what is the appropriate penalty? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. a. Grievant was a nurse on the Children's Unit of the Utah State Hospital. 
b. Grievant had been employed since November 1999. 
c. i. Grievant's employment record apparently is (was) devoid of any problems up to the 
present circumstances.4 Grievant apparently received at a minimum "successfur ratings or higher 
in her job performance evaluations. 
ii. Grievant was an apparently resourceful and dedicated employee having developed 
and coordinated some sort ofanimal therapy program on the children's unit A daughter of Grievant 
was involved on occasion. (SEE "Findings of Fact" 1 .d, immediately below). 
iii. Based on apparent financial needs, Grievant has a history of working extensive 
overtime. 
d. Grievant is a single mother with an apparent adult-age special needs child, Katie, at home. 
2. a. At a Wednesday, February 19,2003 meeting, Grievant was informed that she was being 
administratively transferred from the children's unit to the geriatrics unit. 
b. Present at this meeting in addition to the Grievant were Francesco LePore, Diane Maciel 
and Chris Metcalf 
c. Grievant was informed that she was to report to her new work assignment the following 
day, Thursday, February 20,2003, at 1800 hours (6:00 p.m.). 
3. a. Grievant did not present herself for work on February 20,2003, nor on the following two 
scheduled workdays of Friday, February 21,2003, and Monday, February 24,2003. 
4
 While the testimony at hearing inadvertently alluded to some previous circumstances the parties apparently 
stipulated outside of the record not to reference such at the present hearing. 
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b. Grievant did not call in or "call-off" within two hours in each instance in accordance with 
written hospital policy. 
4. On February 25, 2003, Chris Metcalf, Nursing Administrator, delivered a letter to 
Mark Payne, Hospital Superintendent, informing him of the circumstances concerning Grievant 
requesting that Grievant be terminated based on abandonment of her position for failure to report 
to work as ordered. 
5. On that same day, February 25, 2003, Superintendent Payne signed a letter to Grievant 
informing her that she was being dismissed for abandonment of her position in accordance with the 
Utah Department of Human Resource Management's (DHRM) rule R477-12-2 and informing 
Grievant of her appeal rights to the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. 
6. Grievant filed a timely appeal and a Step 4 meeting with Robin Arnold-Williams, Executive 
Director, Utah Department of Human Services, was held on March 17, 2003. The Grievant was 
represented by legal counsel at the meeting. 
7. Executive Director Arnold-Williams upheld Grievant's dismissal and on March 19, 2003, 
sent a letter to that effect to the Grievant. The Executive Director's letter also referenced Grievant's 
further appeal rights. 
8. Grievant filed a timely notice on April 2, 2003, with the Career Service Review Board 
requesting a Step 5 hearing. 
9. The present Step 5 hearing was held on August 12, 2003. 
BASED ON THE ABOVE and foregoing Findings of Fact, the Presiding Officer enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(a), "The agency has the burden of proof in 
all grievances... .and disputes concerning abandonment of position." 
2. The evidentiary standard by which the agency must meet its burden of proof (persuasion) 
is "substantial evidence," Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c). 
3. "Substantial evidence" is defined as: 
a. [EJvidence possessing something of substance and relevant consequence, and which furnishes 
substantial basis of fact from which issues tendered can be reasonably resolved. It is evidence that 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, but is less than a preponderance. 
Utah Administrative Code R137-1-2; and 
b, [T]hat quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion. First National Bank v. County Board of Equalization, 799 2d 1163, 1165 
(Utah 1990). 
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4. State of Utah DHRM Rule, Utah Administrative Code, R477-12, states to the effect that if 
an employee is absent for more than three consecutive working days without properly notifying their 
supervisor, the employee shall be considered to have abandoned their position. Management may 
terminate their employment for abandonment. If the dismissal is appealed, management may not 
be required to prove an intent by the employee to abandon the position. (Emphasis added) 
5. The Hospital's Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, Section 23, Utah State Hospital Operational 
Policy and Procedure Manual, requires direct care employees to call in at least two hours before the 
start of the shift allowing time to find a replacement. The policy also requires the employee to call 
in each and every day of such absence. 
6 a. Grievant's basic contention is that in the February 19, 2003 meeting she gave verbal 
notice that she would not be able to be at work on February 20,2003 (or any day thereafter), in the 
geriatrics unit.5 
7. Utilizing a "strict" interpretation if, by substantial evidence, the Department can demonstrate 
that Grievanl failed to comply with Hospital Policy 23 by not giving at least two hours call-in or 
call-off notice for three consecutive work days when able to do so and failed to appear at her 
scheduled work time, then Grievant can be said to have abandoned her position when such facts are 
overlaid with DHRM rule R477-12-2. 
8. CSRB rule R137-l-21(3)(b) states: 
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with the procedures set forth above that the 
evidentiary/step5 factual findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing authority, 
then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether the agency's decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. In making this latter determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the 
decision of the agency or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing 
officer shall determine the appropriate remedy. (Emphasis added.) 
DISCUSSION 
1. Having heard the testimony and having seen the witnesses, this Hearing Officer, as anyone 
having seen "both sides of the story," while being empathetic to Grievant's familial circumstances, 
cannot ignore the law of precedent in the area of abandonment. Past CSRB Step 5 decisions, as well 
5Such being based on a myriad of reasons of which two appeared to be the basic foundation of Grievant's position, 
namely: Grievant needed to be with Katie, her special needs daughter, and this was a 6:00 p.m. to after midnight 
shift, and Grievant having an aged mother who she tended the direct interaction with geriatric patients created 
"issues." 
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as past Step 6 decisions, when applied to the present matter, dictate a finding of "abandonment" as 
per DHRM rule R477-12-2.6 
2. Dismissal of an employee is a very serious matter and should not be done and cannot be 
done, as Section 67-19-18(1) states, except "(a) to advance the good of the public service; or (b) for 
just cause." 
3. Grievant was dismissed for an abandonment of her position. Specifically, DHRM 
R477-12-2(l) was the basis for the dismissal. The language of that rule states that employees shall 
be considered to have abandoned their positions when absent for three consecutive work days 
without notifying their supervisors. Furthermore, it states that management may terminate the 
employment of an employee who has abandoned his position. Therefore, abandonment of a position 
occurs when the three consecutive working days pass without notification, but it is at management's 
discretion whether such should result in a termination of their employment. The decision to 
terminate is a discretionary one. As such, a decision (to terminate their employment) should be 
approached and weighed very judiciously. 
4. As referenced, dismissal may (must) be to "advance the good of the public service" or for 
"just cause" {Utah Code, Subsection 67-19-18(1)). The Department, pursuant to statute, has the 
same burden as in any other dismissal case, that is, to present substantial evidence that the Grievant 
did abandon her position. Taking all of the facts into account, Grievant did abandon her position. 
The Department also has the burden once abandonment has been shown to show by substantial 
evidence that the termination of Grievant's employment based on such abandonment advances 
uthe good of public service" or is for "just cause." 
5. a. Without spending extensive time on the Subsection 67-19-18(l)(a) concept of "advance 
the good of the public service," this Hearing Officer feels that the dismissal of Grievant at this time 
does not advance the good of the public service based on the record before him. Substantial 
testimony was presented in some sense by both sides that there is a shortage of qualified nurses at 
the State Hospital The record reflects that Grievant is apparently a qualified and in a word "good" 
nurse. Grievant's personnel record and evaluations would, at least on their face and absent the 
present circumstances, bear such out. The cases cited by the Department in its post-hearing brief and 
other abandonment cases this Hearing Officer has reviewed typically show much more than 
abandonment itself. They show marked insubordination in most instances with extensive histories 
6SEE Titison v. South Valley Social Services, (3 PRB/HO 35 (1982)(Step 5)) and Garcia v. Driver License Division, 
(3 PRB 28 (1986XStep 6)) as set forth in the Department's post-hearing brief, amongst others. 
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of problems. Grievant's record (at least as shown on the present record) are devoid of prior 
problems. In addition, Grievant's past work in the animal therapy program further presents to this 
Hearing Officer a "valued" rather than "valueless" employee. 
b. This Hearing Officer views that a necessary element to a showing that an employee's 
dismissal would advance "the good of the public service" is substantial evidence that the employee's 
retention would be detrimental to "the good of the public service." This the Department failed to 
present. 
c. The Department has failed to meet its burden of showing the termination of Grievant9s 
employment would advance the good of the public service. 
6. a. Subsection 67-19-18(l)(b), which defines "just cause," does not specifically mention 
abandonment as a specific just cause for termination of employment. It does state that those causes 
specifically mentioned in the statute, i.e., performance, skills, competency, efficiency, 
insubordination, disloyalty, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be just cause. In a 
nutshell, Grievant's dismissal, after all the contention of the February 19, 2003 meeting is swept 
away, is for a failure to inform her supervisor that Grievant would not be at work. That reason is 
unlike any mentioned in the statute as a "just cause" reason. 
b. In the present case Grievant's dismissal was not based upon "just cause." It is not based 
upon competency or lack thereof The dismissal is discretionary to management, pursuant to a 
management rule (R477-12-2). 
c. The Department has failed to meet its burden of showing Grievant's dismissal is (was) 
based on "just cause." 
7. This Hearing Officer feels that dismissal of Grievant at this time based on the record before 
this Hearing Officer is (was) an abuse of discretion on the part of the Department. 
8. What then is the appropriate penalty for Grievant's breach of policy and procedure for such 
must be acknowledged in some real sense as "insubordination?"7 
9. a. As a career service employee at the time of her separation from State employment, 
Grievant held the position of nurse since November 1999. 
7This Hearing Officer while acknowledging "insubordination" is a named "just cause" in Subsection 67-19-18(l)(b) 
does not feel the Department based its dismissal on such per se but "hung its hat" specifically if not totally on the 
abandonment of position. While arguably a fine line or "splitting of hairs," the Department is stuck with its basis 
and theory. 
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b. Grievant had been a State employee for close to three and one-half years at the time of 
her separation from service. 
c. Grievant knows the rules and "signed off9 on the specific Section 23 policy that she 
violated which is (was) the basis of her abandonment. 
10. A reduction in pay would seem an appropriate "remedy." 
11. Additionally, this Hearing Officer would point out that as a permanent part of Grievant's 
personnel record, the present circumstances form the basis for possible escalating action by the 
Department should future incidents of insubordination present themselves, including dismissal for 
"just cause" as contemplated by Subsection 67-19-18(1 )(b). 
WHEREFORE, BASED UPON the above and foregoing Conclusions of Law and Discussion 
the Presiding Officer enters the following: 
DECISION 
1. The Utah Department of Human Services has met its burden to show that the Grievant 
abandoned her position. 
2. The Utah Department of Human Services has not met its burden to show that the Grievant's 
dismissal is (was) "to advance the good of the public service" or "for just cause(s)." 
3. The termination of Grievant's employment with the Utah Department of Human Services 
as of February 25,2003, as ordered in the Department's March 19,2003 "final" letter is rescinded. 
4. The Grievant is demoted one pay step on her salary range effective retroactively to 
February 25,2003. 
It is so ORDERED this 29th day of August 2003. 
M&kE.&einfield 
CSRB Hearing Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be jfiled with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b), 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code, subsection 67-19a-407(l)(a)(i), 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 29th day of August 2003, (1)1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision in the matter ofRoyene Aitken v, 
Utah Department of Human Services to the following: 
Royene Aitken 
170 West 1600 North 
OremUT 84057-2645 
(2) I sent an E-mail of the original document to the following: 
Robin Arnold-Williams 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
Mark L Payne 
Superintendent 
Utah State Hospital 
David Gardner 
Human Resource Manager 
Utah State Hospital 
Laurie L. Noda 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Rosaline Ricks 
Human Resource Manager 
Office of Human Resources 
Utah Department of Human Services 
(3) I faxed a copy of the original document to the following: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L.C 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604-3863 
Claudia L. Jones 
Legal Secretary 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENEAITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL BEFORE THE BOARD 
FROM THE HEARING OFFICER'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND DECISION 
Case Nos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22 CSRB/H.0.316 (Step 5) 
Pursuant to Career Service Review Board (CSRB) rule Rl 3 7-1 -22(2) the following dates are hereby 
set for the parties to file their appellate briefs with the CSRB in the above-referenced matter: 
1. Monday, November 10, 2003 - Agency's brief due - one copy to Respondent's Counsel, 
Justin Heideman, and an original and six copies to the CSRB. 
2. Wednesday, December 10,2003, (or 30 calendar days after receipt of Agency's brief, whichever 
is first) - Appellant's brief due - one copy to the Agency's Counsel, Debra Moore, and an original 
and six copies to the CSRB. 
These dates reflect the requirements set forth at Utah Code, R127-1 -22(2)(a) and (b). Should either 
party desire an extension of these dates, they may do so based upon good cause and written request 
to the CSRB. 
DATED this 10th day of October 2003 
Robert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
i>v li 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 10th day of October 2003,1 emailed the foregoing Scheduling Order For The 
Administrative Appeal Before The Board From The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in the matter oiRoyene Aitken v. Utah Department of 
Human Services to: 
Debra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
DEBRAMOOREfoiutah.gov 
and I faxed a copy of the original document to the following: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,UT 84604-3863 
Claudia L. Jones ^ 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 5 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Protecting Utah • Protecting You 
- November 18, 2003 
Via Facsimile and Hand Delivery 
(801)538-3139 
Robert Thompson 
Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Aitken v. Utah Department of Human Services 
22CSRB/H.0.316 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
In response to the Default Certificate submitted to the Board by Mr. Heideman, I write to 
advise you and the Board that I have no record or recollection of having received notice of when 
the brief of the Department of Human Services was due. Based on my conversation with you 
this morning, I understand that the Board's records show that notice was sent to me by email on 
October 10, 2003, but that the email itself can no longer be retrieved to verify receipt. After 
unsuccessfully searching for the notice myself, I requested Scott Morrill, the head of IT 
personnel at the Attorney General's Office to conduct a search. He also was unable to locate an 
email notice to me on that date. Accordingly, I request that the Board allow me a reasonable 
enlargement of time in which to submit a brief on behalf of my client. 
Because of problems with the reliability of email, I suggest that in addition to sending 
notices by email, the Board consider also sending them by mail or fax. Or, if the Board prefers 
to eliminate the hard copy, my office would be willing to designate a backup email address for 
notices from the CSRB. With the federal court, we use a system in which notices are sent to 
both the attorney for record and to a designated backup address. I would appreciate it if you 
would let me know how the Board prefers to handle email notices so that I can take steps to 
avoid similar situations in the future. 
W 7 0 2003 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
Chief Deputy 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH • P.O. Box 140856 • SALT LAKE C ITY , UTAH 84114-0856 
TELEPHONE: (801) 366-0100 • FAX: (801) 366-0101 
Mr. Robert Thompson 
November 18,2003 
Page 2 
Thank you for consideration of my request for an enlargement of time and of my 
suggestions for email notices. 
Sincerely, 
DEBRA J. MOORE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
DJM/tm 
cc: Justin Heideman (fax & mail) 
Scott Morrill 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case Nos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22CSRB/R0.316(Step5) 
In an executive session held on Wednesday, November 19, 2003, the Board considered 
Royene Aitken's (Grievant/Respondent) request that the Board issue a default against the Department of 
Human Services (Department) for its failure to file its brief in support of appeal by the day set forth in the 
scheduling order dated October 10, 2003. 
After carefully considering Grievanf s request and thoroughly reviewing the file associated with this 
matter, the Board rules that an order of default is not appropriate at this time and hereby denies Grievant5 s 
request. The basis for this decision is that there is substantial uncertainty as to whether counsel for the 
Department ever in fact received notice of the Board's October 10, 2003, scheduling order. 
For these reasons, the Board hereby sets the following dates for the parties to file their appellate 
briefs with the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in the above-referenced matter: 
1. The Department's brief must be filed with the offices of the CSRB by Monday, December 8,2003. 
In filing its brief with the CSRB, the Department shall file one original and six copies as well as providing 
a copy to Respondent's Counsel, Justin Heideman. 
2. Grievant's brief must be filed with the offices of the CSRB by Monday, January 12, 2004. 
Grievant must also file one original and six copies as well as providing a copy to the Department's Counsel, 
Debra Moore. 
3. The Board will schedule a Step 6 hearing within 30 days from the date that brief filing is 
complete. 
It is so ORDERED this 19th day of November 2003. 
Dale L. Whittle 
Acting CSRB Chair 
Concurring: Joan M. Gallegos 
FelixJ.McGowan 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 19th day of November 2003,1 faxed the foregoing Order in the matter of 
Royene Aitken v. Utah Department of Human Services to; 
Debra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
801.366-0101 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,UT 84604-3863 
801.374-1724 
Claudia L. Jones s? 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 7 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB 8897) 
LORELEI NAEGLE (USB 9742) 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
Fax: (801) 374-1724 
Attorneys for Grievant 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENEAITKEN, 
Grievant, 
VS. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Agency. 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Request for Hearing 
Case No. 22CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
8 CDRB 75 (Step 6) 
Hearing Officer: Mark E. Kleinfield 
COMES NOW the Grievant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby submits Grievant's Motion to Reconsider or, in the alternative, Request for Interlocutory Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 10, 2003, Administrator Robert W. Thompson issued a Scheduling Order for the 
Administrative Appeal before the Board from the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decision. 
2. The Scheduling order set the due date for the Department of Human Services' ("Agency") brief 
PAGE 1 OF 5 
as November 10, 2003. 
3. On November 10, 2003, Grievant's counsel, Justin Heideman, sent a Default Certificate for the 
Board's approval. 
4. On November 18, 2003, Debra Moore requested an enlargement of time in which to file the 
Agency's Appellate brief. 
5. In response to Ms. Moore's request for enlargement, Mr. Heideman responded that an 
enlargement was inappropriate and urged that the extension be denied. 
6. On November 19, 2003, the Board denied Grievant's request that a default be issued against the 
Agency finding that an order of default was not appropriate due to the substantial uncertainty as to 
whether counsel for the Department ever in fact received notice. 
ARGUMENT 
The Board should grant Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration because notice was properly 
given to the Agency and because the Agency's request for enlargement of the time to file its brief was 
not the result of excusable neglect. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 sets forth the standard for 
reconsideration or relief from an order, and provides in relevant part: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise 
constitute final agency action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with 
the agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
The fact that the Agency received proper notice because the Board complied with the Administrative 
Procedures Act in notifying the Agency of the due date for their brief, because the Agency was otherwise 
notified of the contents of the scheduling order, and because the Agency's request for enlargement does 
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not constitute excusable neglect all constitute grounds for reconsideration of this Board's order and as 
grounds for granting Grievant's Default Certificate. 
The Board sent the Agency proper notice in accordance with Utah law and its own rules of 
procedure. Rule R137-l-8(3)(b) of the Grievance Procedure Rules states in relevant part: 
Distribution of a CSRB notice, decision, order or ruling is accomplished when any of the 
following occurs: (i) deposit postage prepaid with the U.S. Postal Service, (ii) deposit 
with State Mail Services, (iii) personal delivery, (iv) facsimile transmission, or (v) E-mail 
transmission. 
In addition, in Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Dept, 991 P.2d 607, 612 (Ut App 1999), 
where the appellant claimed that he had not received adequate notice of a proceeding, the Court found 
that notice was sufficient where the Department mailed notice in compliance with the statutory notice 
requirements. In this case, the Board met the requirements under Rule R137-1-8 by emailing Debra 
Moore the Scheduling Order, and therefore, service was adequate to give the Agency notice of the filing 
deadlines. 
Furthermore, even if the Board had not emailed the Agency a copy of the Scheduling Order, the 
Agency was already aware of the filing dates. Not only did Mr. Heideman and Lori Norda, the attorney 
handling the matter at the time the case was appealed, discuss the date of the briefing schedule but the 
Agency was also aware of the dates because the dates were set in the course of a telephone conference 
between the Agency, Mr. Heideman, and Mr. Thompson. 
Finally, the Board should grant Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration because the Agency has 
not shown excusable neglect for failing to file its brief prior to the deadline. Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for enlargement of time deadlines, and states that: 
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When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court and act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown 
may at any time in its discretion ... (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect... 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted four non-exclusive factors "relevant to a determination of 
excusable neglect" in West v. Coates, 942 P.2d 337, 340-31 (Utah 1997): 
[i] the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its 
potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the reason for the delay, including whether 
it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in 
good faith. 
Id. (quoting City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co^ 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994) (bracket 
numbering added) Furthermore, in Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, 13 P.3d 616,2000 UT App 299 
(Utah App. 2001), the court specifically held that the trial court had exceeded its discretion by granting 
an extension to file a notice of appeal where Serrato's attorney had misread the Rule 58A notice 
requirement had had failed to meet the thirty-day deadline by four days. 
In this case, the primary concern is the prejudice to Grievant, the non-moving party, will incur 
from further delay of this matter. It has been emphasized repeatedly in this matter that the schedule for 
this matter has been expedited, and that Grievant continues to incur significant expense with the further 
delay of this matter. The standard for finding excusable neglect is essentially one based in equity and 
equity requires that the Agency's failure to meet the brief deadlines result in a default judgment against 
them. Finally, because the Agency requested this appeal, failed to follow up on the dates issued, failed to 
call and find out or check on the schedule, and only requested an enlargement after the deadline past, it 
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has failed to meet the standard of excusable neglect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Grievant requests that this Board grant her Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the alternative, certify this matter for Interlocutory Appeal. Grievant also hereby 
requests a hearing on this matter in order to more fiilly discuss the factors of excusable neglect as set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court as they apply to this case. 
DATED AND SIGNED this $7f-\ day of December 2003. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
y%kE iLEIN^EGLE 
^Attorney for Grievant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this *ZD day of December, 2003, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL was served on the following: 
Service made by: 
By First Class US Mail, postage prepaid and 
Facsimile at 801-366-0101 
Debra J. Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
and 
Service made by: 
First Class US Mail, postage prepaid 
Robert Thompson 
Administerator Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L. L. C. 
Wendy Pomsen 
Legal Assistant 
ADDENDUM 8 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Agency 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROYENE AITKEN, : AGENCY'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
Grievant, : RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN : 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
SERVICES, Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
Agency. Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield 
The Department of Human Services ("Agency") submits this memorandum in opposition 
to Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. 
FACTS 
Agency does not dispute the facts as set forth in the "Statement of Facts" section of 
Grievant's motion for reconsideration, except as follows: 
1. Grievant filed her proposed default certificate with the Board on November 17, 
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2003, not on November 10, 2003 as stated in paragraph 3 of Grievant's statement of facts. 
2. Agency disputes the additional facts alleged in the body of Grievant's motion. In 
particular, Grievant asserts that "the Agency was otherwise notified of the contents of the 
scheduling order," that "Mr. Heideman and Lori Norda [sic], the attorney handling the matter at 
the time the case was appealed, discussed[ed] the date of the briefing schedule," and that 
"Agency was also aware of the dates because the dates were set in the course of a telephone 
conference between the Agency, Mr. Heideman, and Mr. Thompson." See Motion for 
Reconsideration, at pp. 2 & 3. Grievant has provided no evidentiary support for these claims. 
In fact, Agency received no notice of the briefing schedule until November 18, 2003, 
when its counsel Debra Moore received a fax copy of Grievant's proposed default certificate. 
No telephone conference took place with Mr. Thompson concerning the briefing schedule until 
that date. Nor did Ms. Noda ever discuss the briefing schedule with Mr. Heideman. Affidavit of 
Debra Moore, ffl 3, 7 & Exhibit A. 
3. Upon receiving Grievant's proposed default certificate on November 18, 2003, 
Ms. Moore telephoned the office of the Administrator to determine whether notice had in fact 
been sent, and if so, when. Ms. Moore was informed that according to the Certificate of Service, 
notice had been sent on October 10, 2003 by email. Moore Aff. \ 3. 
4. Ms. Moore then searched her computer in an attempt to find any notice from the 
Board concerning this case. She was unable to find any such notice. She also contacted Scott 
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Morrill, Information Technology Manager for the Utah Attorney General's Office and requested 
him to search her computer for any such notice. Mr. Morrill was also unable to find a notice 
from the CSRB or Claudia Jones. See Moore Aff H 4; Affidavit of Scott Morrill, U 4. 
5. After searching in vain for the notice, Ms. Moore contacted the office of the 
Administrator again to inquire whether the email containing the notice had ever been opened. 
She was informed that the email could not be found. Moore Aff. % 5. 
ARGUMENT 
I. GRIEVANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE 
SUMMARILY DENIED BECAUSE THE BOARD'S ORDER GRANTING 
AGENCY AN EXTENSION OF TIME IS NOT A "FINAL AGENCY ACTION" 
Grievant's motion for reconsideration should be denied because the order granting 
Agency an extension of time in which to file a brief is not a "final agency action" and is 
therefore not subject to reconsideration or review under Utah Code section 63-46b-13. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (Supp. 2003). Section 63-46b-13(l)(a) states: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the 
agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the 
order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a written 
request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon 
which relief is requested. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court addressed when an order constitutes a final agency action in Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Common. 2000 UT 40, f 1, 999 P.2d 17, 21. The Court 
stated: 
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[T]he appropriate test to determine whether an agency action is final under 
Utah law includes three parts: 
(1) Has administrative decisionmaking reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences 
flow from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action? 
Id. The Board's order granting Agency ?n extension of time in which to file its brief on appeal 
plainly fails all three parts of the above test. Moreover, Grievant's motion for reconsideration 
simply elaborates on her previous argument to the Board and fails to set forth any new 
information for the Board to consider. Accordingly, Grievant's motion for reconsideration 
should be summarily denied. 
II. THE BOARD'S DECISION TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING AGENCY'S 
BRIEF DID NOT REQUIRE A FINDING OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Even if the Board's order granting Agency an extension of time could be considered a 
"final agency action," Grievant's motion for reconsideration should be denied because the 
extension was properly granted under CSRB Rule 137-1-9. Rule 137-1-9 states: "Upon receipt 
of a notice of hearing, or as soon thereafter as the circumstances necessitating a continuance 
come to a party's knowledge, a party desiring to postpone the proceeding or filing of a pleading 
to a later date shall file a written request for continuance with the administrator." The rule does 
not set forth any express standard for granting a continuance, but does require that "the . . . board 
shall take into account: (a) whether the request was promptly and timely made, in writing; and 
(b) whether the request is for good cause." Rule 137-1-9(2). The rule further provides that "a 
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continuance may not be granted for insufficient cause nor as an excuse for lack of preparation." 
Rule 137-1-9(3). 
Significantly, the rule does not mention or suggest that the Board must find "excusable 
neglect." In this case, Agency filed its written request for an extension the day after Grievant's 
proposed default notice was filed, and as soon as Agency became aware of the dates established 
by the scheduling order. Thus, Agency filed the request both "upon receipt" of notice of the 
scheduling order and "as soon thereafter as circumstances necessitating a continuance [came] to 
[Agency's] knowledge." Because substantial time and effort go into filing a brief on a Step 6 
appeal, Agency probably would have required some extension of time even if counsel had 
inquired about the scheduling order after an unusual lapse of time had occurred without its 
receipt.1 
In addition, Agency demonstrated good cause for the extension by establishing the facts 
supporting the Board's determination that "there is substantial uncertainty as to whether counsel 
for the Department ever in fact received notice of the Board's October 10, 2003 scheduling 
order." The strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits after a full opportunity to 
present the facts and the law also constituted good cause for the extension. 
Grievant's suggestion that because CSRB Rule 137-1-8(3) authorizes distribution of 
orders by email, the Certificate of Service conclusively establishes receipt of the order is 
furthermore, because this is Ms. Moore's first appearance before the CSRB, she is 
unfamiliar with the usual time frame for issuance of the briefing schedule in a Step 6 appeal. 
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incorrect. Certificates of proper service create only a rebuttable presumption of receipt. 
Arguably where service is by email, that presumption applies only when an electronic return 
receipt or confirmation of downloading or printing can be produced. See SSI Medical Services, 
Inc. v. New Jersey, 685 A.2d 1 n.l (N.J. 1996) (discussing proof of service by email). In any 
event, the inability by either Agency or the CSRB to locate the email rebuts any such 
presumption. Consequently, Grievant's motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
i n . THE BOARD PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO FIND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Even if the Board were required to find excusable neglect to grant the requested 
extension, the circumstances here support such a finding. CSRB Rule 137-1-2 defines excusable 
neglect as 
the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes a 
failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the person's 
own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in the processing of a 
grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or 
accident. 
Id. In suggesting that the Board apply the four factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court as 
relevant to whether an extension of time should be granted for filing a notice of appeal because 
of excusable neglect, Grievant ignores Rule 137-1-2. Nevertheless, the circumstances here 
satisfy both tests. 
Agency's request satisfies Rule 137-1-2 because Agency missed the deadline set forth in 
the scheduling order not because counsel was careless, inattentive or willfully ignorant of the 
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deadline, but because the unexpected occurred - that is, notice of the scheduling order was not 
timely received. As mentioned previously, even if Agency counsel had contacted the CSRB 
after noticing an unusual lapse of time, some additional time would probably have been needed 
in which to properly prepare and file Agency's brief. Unlike a notice of appeal, which can be 
prepared in a matter of minutes, preparation of an appellate brief requires substantial time and 
effort. 
The circumstances in this case also satisfy the four, non-exclusive factors set forth by the 
Supreme Court in West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 341-42 (Utah 1997): "[1] the danger of 
prejudice to the non-moving party; [2] the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control 
of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good faith/' Id (quotations and alteration 
marks omitted). Although Grievant alleges prejudice, none has been demonstrated by record 
evidence and, from an objective viewpoint, the additional three weeks time granted by the Board 
is relatively insignificant. Similarly, the second factor - the length of the delay - is not a major 
consideration in these circumstances where the delay is relatively short and no previous 
extensions have been granted. Whether Agency received notice of the scheduling order was not 
within its control and therefore the third factor strongly weighs in favor of the extension.2 And, 
2
 In Reisbeck v. HCA Health Services, Inc., 2000 UT 48, f 13,2 P.3d 447,450, the Utah 
Supreme Court clarified that where the reason for the requested extension was "special 
circumstances that are essentially beyond a party's control," the test is a more liberal "good 
cause" standard. Id Here, delivery of the scheduling order was beyond Agency's control. 
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as to the fourth factor, no reason to question Agency's good faith in this matter has been 
demonstrated. Therefore, Grievant's motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
IV. GRIEVANT'S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, NOT THE BOARD 
It is difficult to understand how Grievant's interest in avoiding delay would be furthered 
by an interlocutory appeal of the Board's order granting Agency an extension of time in which to 
file a brief. The time granted by the order has now elapsed and Agency's brief has been filed. 
Furthermore, Grievant's motion for interlocutory appeal is improperly filed before the Board. 
Interlocutory appeals are authorized by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 
5(a) provides that "An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after 
the entry of the order of the trial court . . ." Therefore, Grievant's motion for an interlocutory 
appeal should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of December, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
DEBRALMOORE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Agency 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of December, 2003,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AGENCY'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, to the following: 
Justin Heideman 
Ascione and Heideman 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,Utah 84604 
% PVhL-
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ylf 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Agency 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
DEC l 5 £003 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Agency. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT MORRILL 
8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Scott Morrill, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
1. I am the Information Technology Manager at the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. On November 18,2003, Debra Moore asked me to search her computer for an email 
from Claudia Jones of the Career Service Review Board containing the briefing schedule for the 
Aitken matter. 
3. I immediately attempted to locate the missing email by conducting a search of Ms. 
Moore's Group Wise mailbox for emails received between October 10, 2003 and November 18, 
2003. 
4. I found no emails from Ms. Jones or the CSRB containing a briefing schedule in the 
Aitken case. 
DATED this Jjl day of December, 2003. 
V//£// 
SCOTT MORRILL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \&y day of December, 2003. 
'"' NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARLGA FURLONG 
160 E. 300 So., Cth Pr. 
Salt Uko City. Utah 84114 
My Commission Expire* 
March 1,2008 
STATE OF UTAH I 
kl 
NOTARY PUBLI 
^ C A ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
s ^ ? 3 a y of Zf iy^ fe f 20Q3,1 I hereby certify that on this 4/- ay  /U(£[/VvU(^ 2003,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT 
MORRILL, to the following: 
Justin Heideman 
Ascione and Heideman 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,Utah 84604 
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DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Agency 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROYENE AITKEN, : AFFIDAVIT OF DEBRA J. MOORE IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
Grievant, : RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN : 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
SERVICES, Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
Agency. Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Debra Moore, having been duly sworn upon oath, state: 
1. I am counsel of record for the Utah Department of Human Services in the above 
captioned matter. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I have no record or recollection of having received notice of the Board's October 
10, 2003 scheduling order until November 18, 2003, when I received a fax copy of Grievant's 
proposed default certificate, which showed a transmittal date of November 17, 2003 at 4:30 p.m. 
3. I did not participate in any telephone conference with CSRB Administrator 
Robert Thompson, with Grievant's counsel Justin Heideman, or with anyone else concerning the 
scheduling order until November 18, 2003. On that day, after receiving Grievant's proposed 
default certificate, I telephoned the office of the Administrator to determine whether notice had 
in fact been sent, and if so, when. I was informed that according to the Certificate of Service, 
notice had been sent on October 10, 2003 by email. 
4. I then searched my computer in an attempt to find any notice from the Board 
concerning this case. I was unable to find any such notice. I also contacted Scott Morrill, 
Information Technology Manager for the Utah Attorney General's Office, and requested him to 
search my computer for any such notice. Mr. Morrill was also unable to find a notice from the 
CSRB or Claudia Jones. 
5. I then contacted the office of the Administrator again to inquire whether the email 
containing the notice had ever been opened. Mr. Thompson informed me that the email could 
not be found. 
6. Later that same day, I received a copy of a letter to Mr. Thompson from Mr. 
Heideman dated November 18,2003, opposing my request for an extension of time in which to 
file Agency's brief. In the letter, Mr. Heideman represented that he had discussed the briefing 
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schedule with Laurie Noda, previous counsel for Agency, and that he had participated in a 
telephone conference with "the state" and Mr. Thompson in which the schedule was set. 
7. I forwarded a copy of Mr. Heideman's November 18 letter to Laurie Noda and 
requested her to advise me whether Mr. Heideman's representations were true. A true and 
correct copy of her response by email is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2003. 
iB^A J. MOOkfe 
5K^ 
DE I 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of December, 2003. 
NOIARV PUBUt '1 
MARLEA FURLONG 
t60E,300So.,ethflr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
My Commission Expires 
March 1,2006 
STATE OF UTAH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of December, 2003,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEBRA J, 
MOORE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, to the following: 
Justin Heideman 
Ascione and Heideman 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,Utah 84604 
/^Q/fyjfoL 
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EXHIBIT A 
Debra Moore - Re: Page 1 
rrom: Laurie woua 
To: Debra Moore 
Date: 11/18/03 2:23PM 
Subject: Re: 
No. I filed the notice of appeal with the CSRB and turned the case over to you. 
> » Debra Moore 11/18/03 01:05PM > » 
Laurie, 
Did you ever participate in a teleconference with Mr. Heideman and Mr. Thompson concerning the 
briefing schedule? 
Debra 
> » Laurie Noda 11/18/03 01:48PM > » 
Debra, 
I have reviewed the letter that Justin Heideman sent to you in regards to the Royene Aitkin Step 6 
Appeal. Mr. Heideman is incorrect that he and I ever agreed to dates in regard to a briefing schedule. I 
notified him that the Agency was appealing the Step 5 deciision but had no coversation with him about a 
briefing schedule. In fact only the CSRB has the authoriity to do that. Secondly I had no conversation with 
him about an order expediting the transcript of the hearing. Additionally I never received a call from the 
court reporter indicating that the transcript was being expedited. 
My conversation with Mr. Heideman related only to the issue of the Agency filing an appeal of the Step 5 
decision. 
If you have any further questions about this, please let me know. 
Laurie 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency, 
DENIAL OF GRIEVANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Case No. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
Case No. 22 CSRB/H.0.316 (Step 5) 
On Monday, December 8, 2003, Royene Aitken (Grievant) through her attorney of record, 
Justin Heidemen, filed a Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal of the Career 
Service Review Board's (Board) November 19,2003 Order denying Grievant's request for default 
and setting a new scheduling order. After carefully considering Grievant's request and thoroughly 
reviewing the file associated with this matter, the Board HEREBY DENIES Grievant's request for 
reconsideration. In addition, the Board is unaware of any rules governing interlocutory appeals at 
the Board level and therefore denies such an appeal 
It is so ORDERED this 27th day of January 2004. 
^r l^-
Blake S. Atkin, Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139 
Jan 28 04 1 0 : 5 2 a C a r ^ r S e r v i c e R e v i e w Bd {Br^ 5 3 8 - 3 1 3 9 p . 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 28th day of January 2004,1 faxed the foregoing Denial ofGrievant's Motion 
For Reconsideration or Interlocutory Appeal in the matter of Royene Aitken v. Utah Department 
of Human Services to: 
Debra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
801.366-0101 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604-3863 
801.374-1724 
Claudia L. Jones ^ ^ 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 10 
Jan 29 04 04:54p Career Service Review Bd (801 l 538-3139 p . 2 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
NOTICE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL HEARING 
BEFORE THE BOARD 
CaseNos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22 CSRB/H.0,316 (Step 5) 
DATE: Friday, February 20,2004 
TIME: 11:00 a.m. 
PLACE: Conference Room N4110 
Salt Lake County Government Center 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-3150 
ISSUES: To hear oral argument on appellant's appeal according to Utah Code Sections 
67-19a-407 and67-19a-408 and Utah Administrative Code R137-1-22 (Supp. 2003) 
and the Agency's Motion to Dismiss Grievance for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
A party's failure to appear may result in a default. 
DATED this 28th day of January 2004. 
IAX 
{.obert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.1561 • (801) 538-3048 • Fax (801) 538-3139 
Jan 29 04 0 4 : 5 4 p Car*»~>r S e r v i c e Review Bd (80* 1 538 -3139 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 29th day of January 2004, (1) I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the 
foregoing Notice of an Administrative Appeal Hearing Before the Board in the matter of 
Royene Aitken v. Utah Department of Human Services to the following: 
Royene Aitken 
170 West 1600 North 
OremUT 84057-2645 
CSRB Board Members 
HAND DELIVERED 
(2) I sent an E-mail of the original document to the following: 
Robin Arnold-Williams (FY1) 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Human Services 
RARNOLD@utah.aov 
Mark I. Payne (FYT) 
Superintendent 
Utah State Hospital 
MPAYNE@utah.gov 
David Gardner 
Human Resource Manager 
Utah State Hospital 
DGARPNfcKffiutah.aov 
Dehra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
D E B RAMOOREfflu tah. gov 
Rosanne Ricks (FY1) 
Human Resource Manager 
Office of Human Resources 
Utah Department of Human Services 
RRlCKSflftutah.gov 
(3) I faxed a copy of the original document to the following: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay L.L.C, 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604-3863 
801.374.1724 
Debra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
801.366.0101 
tZ&^s* /^^« £ ^ 
Claudia L. Jones 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 11 
STATE OF U T A H 
O F F I C E OF T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L 
M A R K L. S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A HINTZE 
Chief Deputy 
KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy 
September 8, 2003 
Thacker & Co., LLC 
c/o Tiffany 
50 West Broadway, Suite 905 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2036 
Re: RoveneAitken v. Utah Department of Human Services 
22CSRB/H.0.316 
Dear Tiffany: 
This is to follow up on our telephone conversation this morning. I am confirming the 
request of the transcript from the August 12, 2003 hearing regarding the above-referenced case. 
It is my understanding that the original will be sent to the Career Service Review Board and we 
will receive a copy and the two agencies will split the cost. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Tiffini Moss, Legal Secretary to 
DEBRAJ.MOORE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
/tm 
cc: Claudia Jones, CSRB 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH • P O Bex 140856 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0856 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 6 - 0 1 0 0 FAX ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 6 - 0 1 0 1 
ADDENDUM 12 
Receipt of Delivery 
Case Name: Aitken vs. Utah Department of Human Services 
Attorney: Debra J. Moore 
File No: 1162 
Witness: Hearing / Full Copy of Transcript w/mini 
Received by: . 
Name: y^Y I Su CM, V*C/^ 
Date: lOjjfU 1 
Time: H^O 
Delivered by Courier 
ADDENDUM 13 
PATRICK J. ASCIONE (USB 6469) 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB 8897) 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
Fax: (801) 374-1724 
Attorneys for Grievant 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Agency. 
MEMORANDUM OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONTROLLING 
AUTHORITIES AND 
DOUCMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
GRIEVANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Request for Hearing 
Case No. 22CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
8 CDRB 75 (Step 6) 
Hearing Officer: Mark E. Kleinfield 
COMES NOW the Grievant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby submits Grievant's Memorandum of Supplemental Controlling Authorities and Documents in 
Support of Grievant5 s Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Debra J. Moore ("Ms. Moore"), by and through her assistant, personally requested a transcript of 
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the August 12, 2003 Step 5 hearing. 
2. Ms. Moore confirmed the transcript request in her letter dated September 8, 2003. [See letter 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A"]. 
3. Delivery of the transcript of the August 12, 2003 hearing was effected by courier on October 8, 
2003 at 4:40 p.m. at the office of Debra J. Moore, [See attached "Receipt of Delivery" attached 
hereto as "Exhibit B"]. 
ARGUMENT 
The timeframe for filing an appeal brief to a evidentiary/step 5 hearing is set forth in Rule 137-1-
22 (2)(a) of the Utah Administrative Code, which states: 
(a) The appellant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of the 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript the appellant has 30 calendar 
days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally, 
the respondent must be provided with a copy of the appellant's brief, 
(emphasis added). 
This rule clearly states that the Department of Human Services ("Appellant" or "the Agency"), as 
represented by Ms. Moore, was required to file its brief within thirty (30) days from the October 8, 2003. 
Exhibit "B" clearly establishes the fact that Ms. Moore's office received the transcript on October 8, 
2003. Thus, upon receipt of the transcript, Ms. Moore was under statutory notice that the due date for the 
Agency's brief was November 8, 2003. Therefore, it must logically be concluded that Ms. Moore either 
ignored the statutory timing for the filing of the Agency's brief, and subsequently filed her appeal in 
error; or was completely cognizant of the fact that the time for filing the Agency's brief had lapsed and 
despite the untimely nature of the brief, proceeded to file anyway. Grievant is deeply troubled by the fact 
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that the Agency has entirely failed to disclose to the Board this controlling statutory authority that 
controls timing in this case. 
Given the Agency's failure to timely file, the Agency must now, in order to maintain their appeal 
prove that their failure to timely file constitutes excusable neglect. However, as set forth in Rule 137-1-2 
of the Utah Administrative Code excusable neglect is defined as: 
The exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes a failure to 
take proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the person's own carelessness, 
inattention, or willful disregard in the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of 
some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, (emphasis added). 
The Agency has not, and cannot, argue that its thirty-day (30) delay in filing an appeal was the 
result of unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, because Exhibit B clearly evidences 
that Ms. Moore's office received the transcript by courier service on October 8, 2004. If Ms. 
Moore failed to personally receive the transcript then her office must bear the consequence of that 
carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard for the procedures for filing an appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Grievant requests that the board grant Grievant's Motion for 
Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /$_ day of February 2004. 
AsciofeHEiDEMAN &JMCKAY, L.L.C 
ICKJ.ASCIONE, 
Attorney for Grievant 
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EXHIBIT A 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
Chief Deputy 
September 8, 2003 
Thacker & Co,, LLC 
c/o Tiffany 
50 West Broadway, Suite 905 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2036 
Re: Rovene Aitken v. Utah Department of Human Services 
22 CSRB/H.O. 316 
Dear Tiffany: 
This is to follow up on our telephone conversation this morning, I am. confinning the 
request of the transcript from the August 12,2003 hearing regarding the above-referenced case. 
It is my understanding that the original will be sent to the Career Service Review Board and we 
will receive a copy and the two agencies will split the cost. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Tiffini Mass, Legal Secretary to 
DEBRAIMOORE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
/tm 
cc: Claudia Jones, CSRB 
KIRK TORGCNSEN 
Chief Deputy 
EXHIBIT B 
Receipt of Delivery 
Case Name: Aitken vs. Utah Department of Human Services 
Attorney: Debra J. Moore 
File No: 1162 
Witness: Hearing / Full Copy of Transcript w/mini 
Received by: . 
Name: VvE / S,i* CM y~e/s\ sited I 
Date: lOMd 1 
Time: HMb 
Delivered by Courier 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this I day of February, 2004, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL CONTROLLING 
AUTHORITIES AND DOUCMENTS IN SUPPORT OF GRIEVANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL was served on the following: 
Service made by: 
By First Class US Mail, postage prepaid and 
Facsimile at 801-366-0101 to: 
Debra J. Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
and 
Service made by: 
First Class US Mail, postage prepaid 
and Facsimile at 801-538-3139 to: 
Robert Thompson 
Administrator Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L. L, C 
hm 
SHAUNTEL HART 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the n day of October, 2004,1 caused to be delivered via the following 
method two copies of the foregoing to the following: 
Nancy Kemp 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Attorney for Appellee 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P. O. Box 140856 
• •  U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile -363-0400 
JSt Hand-Delivered 
D Federal Express 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
